Examining arbitrage opportunities among Canadian cross-listed securities : evidence from stock and option markets by Li, Zhen
 EXAMINING ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES AMONG CANADIAN 
CROSS-LISTED SECURITIES: EVIDENCE FROM STOCK AND OPTION 
MARKETS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
The College of Graduate Studies and Research 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science in Finance 
In the Department of Finance and Management Science  
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
 
 
By 
Zhen Li 
 
 
 
 
©Copyright Zhen Li, August, 2009  All rights reserved. 
 
i 
 
PERMISSION TO USE 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Degree of 
Master of Science in Finance from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries 
of the University of Saskatchewan may make it freely available for inspection. I 
further agree that permission for copying this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, 
for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my 
thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College 
in which my thesis was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use 
of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the Univer-
sity of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis. 
Requests for permission to copy or make other use of materials in this thesis in whole 
or in part should be addressed to: 
Head of the Department of Finance and Management Science 
Edwards School of Business 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
S7N 5A7 
  
  
ABSTRACT 
 
A cross-border listing occurs when an individual company establishes a secondary listing 
on a stock exchange abroad. In this paper, we analyze and compare the arbitrage proportions 
(through violation of put-call parity) of publicly traded cross-listed Canadian stocks, and 
those of industry and performance matched US domestically-listed shares. The cross-listed 
Canadian stocks are listed on both of the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and either the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). 
 Arbitrage opportunities exist when put-call parity is violated. Our empirical results show 
that in most circumstances, both domestic put-call parity and cross-border put-call parity hold 
well in the two countries. However, in Canadian market, a high proportion of arbitrage op-
portunities could be detected in closing prices on the particular date of March 14, 2007.  
On March 14th 2007, many of the observations in the Canadian market contained arbi-
trage opportunities. Both domestic and cross-border put-call parity was violated. However, 
we fail to find the same phenomenon in the US market. In the US market, opportunities for 
arbitrage occur rarely and sporadically. We also find that the option trading volume in the 
Canadian market is lower than that in the US market, and during dramatic market price drops, 
the option trading volume remains at a low level. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
As economic globalization increases, more and more corporations are establishing 
cross-listings on foreign stock exchanges. This increases firms’ access to new equity capital, 
and existing cross-listed home-country public shares benefit from greater liquidity and pric-
ing efficiency when firms inter-list in foreign stock exchanges, such as the US stock ex-
changes. Consolidation and competition with foreign markets lower the barriers to capital 
flows and make information release more efficient. Further domestic investors may take ad-
vantage of enhanced liquidity and favourable lower cost of domestic capital market, allowing 
them to enjoy higher valuations.  
 A cross-border listing (inter-listing, dual listing, or simply cross-listing) occurs when an 
individual company establishes a secondary listing on a stock exchange abroad. In this paper, 
we analyze and compare the proportions of arbitrage opportunities available to publicly 
traded inter-listed Canadian stocks, and those of industry and performance matched US do-
mestically-listed shares. The cross-listed Canadian stocks are listed on both of the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX) and either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX). 
There is a rich literature on the impact of cross-listings on stock price behaviour. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, there are only a few existing studies that attempt to exam-
ine how cross-listing behaviour influences option markets. By adopting put-call parity, we 
relate the stock prices to their corresponding options. The arbitrage opportunities we investi-
gate in this paper are obtained from deviations of prices from their rational range implied by 
put-call parity.  
In this paper, we examine the issue of whether cross-listings bring more arbitrage oppor-
tunities to market quotes. Segmentations between the US and Canada, including information 
release insufficiency, legal dissimilarities, and variation in transaction costs are likely to lead 
the multiple-market setting to contain more arbitrage opportunities. In other words, market 
prices of dual-listed stocks may lie beyond their rational range more frequently than the mar-
ket quotes of an otherwise equivalent purely domestically-listed security. However, the em-
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pirical evidence from arbitrage tests in this paper rejects this hypothesis, and suggests a high 
level of integration between the two countries. 
Consequently, we test the “dominant-satellite” relationship between the US and Canadian 
markets in this paper. When information arrives, prices adjust based on expectations of in-
vestors and traders. Compared to the satellite market, the dominant market is more sensitive 
to the shocks, thus, price adjustment first takes place in the dominant market. In order to keep 
a long run integrated relationship, satellite price quotes adjust to their counterparts in the 
dominant market. Due to communication lags between the two countries, market quote viola-
tions may occur more frequently in the satellite market. Ordinarily, it is assumed that the 
home country is the dominant and the foreign country is the satellite. However in this case, 
since the US market is larger and more liquid, it’s possible that these roles are reversed for 
Canadian cross-listed stocks. Furthermore, since the two countries are highly integrated in 
terms of access to information with primarily common time zones, neither market may 
dominate the other. Based on the empirical results of arbitrage proportions, it seems that 
put-call parity generally holds well in both Canadian and US markets. Therefore, it is difficult 
to determine which country is dominant using this criterion. Investigation into the ten largest 
stock price drops in the Canadian market in 2007 suggests that the Canadian quotes tend to 
follow the US quotes. 
In addition, we check the robustness of our results. Slight differences in proportion of ar-
bitrage opportunities are found between the cross-listed samples and a purely US control 
sample, and a puzzle we uncover is that most of the arbitrage opportunities among the Cana-
dian quotes of the cross-listed stocks occur on one particular day, Mar 14, 2007. This was one 
day after a dramatic price drop (around 2%) in both Canadian and US stock markets. The dis-
similarity of price movements of the two countries’ markets after this market slump and the 
relatively low option trading volume in Canada may explain the temporary violations of 
put-call parity in the Canadian market in this extreme case. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 outlines the motivation 
for the research and provides a useful theoretical backdrop for the various existing studies 
related to the topic. Chapter 3 develops the key hypotheses about arbitrage proportions of 
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cross-listings. Chapter 4 describes the data employed and the filter used in the study. The 
methodology used to test the hypotheses and explore the factors that influence arbitrage in 
cross-listings is presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 analyzes the empirical results. Robustness 
check of results is provided in Chapter 7, and the conclusions along with limitations of the 
study, follow in Chapter 8.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the pertinent literature for this thesis. Section 1 presents the defini-
tion of arbitrage and how it applies to the special cases described in previous studies. Section 
2 discusses the evolution and motivation behind cross-listings. The drawbacks of 
dual-listings will also be analyzed in this section. Furthermore, the feasibility of making 
comparisons between the US market and Canadian market will be discussed. Section 3 fo-
cuses on put-call parity and documents the literature about options and short-sell restrictions.  
2.1 Arbitrage 
Arbitrage is one of the most important concepts in finance theory, and most existing 
pricing theories and models are related to it. Rational pricing theory assumes that any devia-
tion from arbitrage-free price levels for an asset results in the price difference being “arbitra-
ged away,” since an arbitrageur could profit from mispriced securities. A common textbook 
definition of arbitrage is as follows: 
“An arbitrage opportunity is a self-financing trading strategy 
that generates positive real wealth with no risk.” (Jarrow, 
1992 ). 
In a multi-market situation, arbitrage is closely related to “the law of one price,” which 
states that the same asset must trade at the same price on all markets. Violation of the law of 
one price leads to an arbitrage opportunity for traders who can participate in both markets. In 
this paper, we derive a rational range for each stock, based on put-call parity. If the market 
quote violates the corresponding range, an arbitrage opportunity may exist. Arbitrageurs earn 
risk-free profits by buying at a relatively low price and selling high. 
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) investigated arbitrage in mergers and acquisitions, which 
consists of buying the stock of a takeover target company while shorting the shares of the 
acquiring company. Erickson et al. (2003) worked on municipal bond arbitrage and illustrated 
how tax factors play a crucial role in municipal bond arbitrages. In terms of convertible bond 
arbitrage, arbitrageurs have options to return the bond to the issuing company in exchange for 
shares of the company’s stock.  
Gagnon et al. (2004) studied multi-market trading and arbitrage existence. Dual-listed 
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companies provided the major multi-market situation in their paper. Arbitrage opportunities 
are established by taking a long position in the relatively underpriced part, and shorting the 
relatively overpriced part. Following the definition of arbitrage given by Jarrow (1992), we 
focus on arbitrage derived from violations of put-call parity for dual-listed Canadian stocks 
and domestic-listed US stocks.1 
2.2 Cross-listed stocks 
Since the 1970s, internationalization of markets has been increasing. Institutions and in-
vestors invest capital in foreign stock markets to diversify their portfolios, reduce risks, and 
gain higher risk-adjusted returns than with purely domestic portfolios. If the foreign and do-
mestic markets are segmented, a diversification effect should result from an international 
listing, causing a decrease in the standard deviation of stock returns (Howe and Madura, 
1990). Mittoo (1992a) pointed out that companies perceive enhanced marketability, increased 
exposure for their products, and growth of shareholder base as crucial benefits of 
cross-border listings. The author examined the stock return of the dual listed companies and 
the empirical results suggested that the advantages of cross-listings overwhelm the high cost 
of dual listings, such that the net outcome of inter-listings should be positive. A similar result 
was obtained by Foerster and Karolyi (1993). They focused on cross-listed international 
stocks in the US market, and suggested that newly listed firms have the opportunity to fi-
nance their funds from a larger and more liquid market, which influences the cost of capital to 
some extent. However, some authors have argued that the investment barriers between for-
eign and home markets for cross-listings, such as transaction costs, information costs, and 
government controls on foreign exchanges, lead to market segmentation.  
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) extended the law of one price to derivatives. They found 
that, if stocks or derivatives are dual-listed on several stock exchanges, the market quotes on 
them in multiple locations are not always identical, due to different transaction costs stem-
ming from various markets. Black (1974) suggested that some type of risk premium should 
                                                        
1 We use put-call parity, instead of the usual “law of one price” to identify arbitrage opportunities among 
cross-listed securities, because it allows us to investigate them separately in both domestic and international 
markets. This is critical for making inferences about issues such as the dominant-satellite relationship, which we 
discuss below. 
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be added to the expected return of inter-listed stocks to compensate for the costs attributable 
to the barriers previously mentioned. Errunza and Losq (1985) established a valuation model 
on multi-national assets, and their findings supported the notion that the world markets are 
semi-integrated, and the return of dual-listed stocks exceed the theoretical return obtained 
from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  
Most of these studies focus on the US market because of its size and liquidity. Xu and 
Fung (2004) investigated source-based Japanese derivatives cross-listed in the US, and they 
showed that the US markets have a strong link with Japanese markets. In addition, 
cross-market information flows lead US exchanges to make a greater contribution to returns 
in Japan. Hasbrouck (1995) examined the price discovery of dual-listed stocks in US markets. 
US markets are very efficient in providing a common price (the equilibrium prices of stock 
exchanges) to domestic markets. Therefore, US markets may play an important role in inter-
national listing.  
Conversely, previous studies about cross-listings show that firms will initially consider a 
similar market or one within its trading bloc when choosing a place of inter-listing. This was 
expressed in studies such as Harvey (1990) and Biddle and Saudagaran (1989). Biddle and 
Saudagaran (1989) suspected that the importance of financial disclosure levels in different 
countries would be a major factor in inter-listing decisions. 
In this study, we choose Canada-US cross-listed firms for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
Canada is the largest trading partner for the US and they share many cultural and business 
activities as well as close geographic proximity. Second, the number of cross-listed Canadian 
firms in the US is large enough to provide a substantial and accessible sample for our re-
search. According to the listing information provided by the NYSE, Canadian stocks repre-
sent the largest group of foreign stocks listed in the US exchange from a single country, 
Moreover, those inter-listed Canadian stocks trade actively in both the domestic and US 
markets, which provides an opportunity for analyses. The coincidence of trading hours be-
tween 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time makes it easier to conduct tests on observations 
occurring simultaneously on the two exchanges (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003). Lastly, unlike 
securities from most other countries that are usually listed as American depositary receipts 
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(ADRs), Canadian securities are listed as ordinary shares. 
Additional advantages of Canadian ordinaries can be found in Pulatkonak (1999). First, 
the certificate traded in the US for a dual-listed Canadian stock is identical to the one traded 
in Canada. Second, cross-border ownership and trading in the two countries are legal. Third, 
converting U.S securities to Canadian ones are not charged “conversion fees.” Moreover, 
dividends may be paid in either US or Canadian dollars, regardless of trade locations. These 
advantages lead to the prevalence of inter-listings between Canada and the US.  
Another motive to examine Canada-US inter-listed stocks involves the degree of inte-
gration or segmentation derived from the existence of investment barriers between the two 
markets. The result is that the expected returns of securities in one market may be different 
from that of the other market. Most literature in the early 1980s reports evidence of segmen-
tation between the two countries; however, recent studies show that US and Canadian finan-
cial markets are fundamentally integrated. For example, Foerster et al. (1993) paid attention 
to trading volume. Their basic idea is that if there are different costs of trading stocks in Ca-
nadian and US financial markets, cross-listing of a stock should lead to a boost in overall 
trading volume; their regression results support this. Moreover, Eun and Sabherwal (2003) 
examined prices on the US exchanges and TSX, and found that the prices are non-stationary 
with a unit root, but they are co-integrated. 
2.3 Put-call parity 
In this paper, we aim to test for arbitrage on inter-listed stocks. The basic methodology is 
based on put-call parity, which is one of the most important no-arbitrage relations between 
stocks and options: 
ܥ െ ܲ ൌ ܵ െ ܸܲሾܭሿ.  ሺ2.3.1ሻ
One assumption of put-call parity is that, investors can buy and short the underlying securi-
ties without limitation. In other words, if short-selling constraints exist, which makes it more 
difficult to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities involving over-priced shares, then this 
no-arbitrage relationship may collapse. Ofek et al. (2004) provided evidence of a robust rela-
tionship between violations of no arbitrage put-call parity and short-sale restrictions. Baruch 
et al. (2007) claimed that if a stock price is irrationally high, it is potentially difficult for ra-
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tional investors to sell them short and bring the price back to its rational level, because those 
traders cannot borrow and short it at a reasonable cost. In addition, even if investors find 
shares to sell short, the risk that the shorted shares may be recalled before the anticipated 
market correction or liquidation date may still limit arbitrage (Battalio and Schultz, 2006). 
Short selling restrictions would create the inequality constraint 
C – P+ PV[K] ≤ S, ሺ2.3.2ሻ
which suggests violations of put-call parity should be more prevalent in only one direction. 
However, these violations are rare in our sample, and there is no significant evidence to show 
that they occur more frequently than the opposite violations. 
With the development of derivatives, stock options are viewed as a highly useful and 
valuable market communications medium. Spais (2002) argued that stock options add value 
in business markets. Detemple and Selden (1991) demonstrated the option and the stock 
markets interact in general. Chakravarty et al. (2004) supported this argument by using the 
joint time series of stock prices and option-implied stock prices and found that price discov-
ery occurs in both the stock and option markets. There is an extensive and growing literature 
that explores the links between short sales and option markets. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) 
suggested that option introduction contributes to the mitigation of effects developed from 
short-sale constraints. According to Ofek et al. (2004), a synthetic short-sale stems from the 
portfolio formed by buying a call, writing an equivalent put, and taking a long position of a 
bond. Mayhew and Mihov (2004) found that options play a crucial role in eliminating the 
disadvantages of short-sale constraints, as they said: 
“Option markets facilitate short selling by allowing the low-
est-cost trader to establish the short position in the underlying 
market. The introduction of traded options represents an eco-
nomically important relaxation of short-sale constraints. There 
are several documented ways by which option markets lower 
the costs of short selling: First, they permit traders to take lev-
eraged short positions without having to find a certain lender 
for the stock, post a large margin and trade under the ‘uptick 
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rule’.” 
Generally, investors can take synthetic short positions in option markets to dispose of 
short-sale constraints. Empirical evidence found in Battalio et al. (2006) illustrates the ad-
vantages of synthetic shorts. As the expected proceeds from a synthetic short created from 
options and the expected proceeds from an actual short sale are almost the same, even 
hard-to-borrow stocks can be easily sold short synthetically, provided they have relatively 
liquid options trading on them. Moreover, synthetic shorts also have advantages that may 
offset their small additional costs to some extent such as the elimination of investors’ “recall 
risk.”  
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3 HYPOTHESES 
The internationalization of stock markets allowed companies that formerly raised capital 
only in domestic markets to tap foreign sources by listing their stocks on foreign exchanges. 
An increasing number of firms, driven by marketing and financing advantages, in both de-
veloped and developing countries are affected by this trend, including many Canadian corpo-
rations, especially resource-based companies. 
 This chapter is designed to describe the hypotheses regarding the comparison between 
the domestically-listed and the cross-listed samples, and within the cross-listed samples. Sec-
tion 1 outlines how arbitrage opportunities are expected to differ between inter-listing sam-
ples and the purely US sample, while Section 2 discusses the dominant-satellite relationship 
and how arbitrage opportunities differ between the Canadian and US samples. 
3.1 Effects of Cross-listing on arbitrage opportunities 
A complex trading structure develops for cross-listed firms. Licht (2006) pointed out that 
when a stock trades on more than one market, investors still stand ready to close any gap that 
develops between pieces of the same security in each market to seek arbitrages. According to 
the law of one price, such arbitrage opportunities will soon disappear and only one price will 
prevail for each stock. Arbitrageurs profit by buying underpriced securities and selling over-
priced securities. Employing a CAPM framework, Jorion and Schwartz (1986) analyze inte-
gration and segmentation in the Canadian and the US stock market. With perfect integration, 
priced risk should be the systematic risk relative to the world market. As for complete seg-
mentation, the only priced risk should be the domestic systematic risk. Failing to find either 
of these, the authors report partial segmentation in the two countries. Knez and Chen (1995) 
claim that the extent to which any two markets are segmented could be measured by the ex-
tent to which the law of one price is violated. If markets are partially or mildly integrated, in 
terms of cross-listings, profits are generated from executing cross-border transactions at 
lower cost, that is, arbitrageurs gain from purchasing stocks that yield higher return for com-
parable levels of risk. For market integration and segmentation, the question arises: do 
cross-listed stocks contain more arbitrage, compared with purely-domestic listed stocks? Ca-
nadian cross-listed stocks are ideal to test this question. 
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Jorion et al. (1986) find segmentation between markets, reject integration in the US and 
Canada, and explain it through legal barriers. These legal barriers include securities regula-
tion and corporation governance regimes. Different countries provide a variety of business 
laws to warrant an efficient social order for production and investment. These laws not only 
affect publicly traded corporations but also investors. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothe-
sis indicates that the impact these laws have on corporations and investors will immediately 
be impounded in market quotes. Cross-listing leads to a more complex trading structure and 
may be influenced by more laws and constraints. For example, when a recently enacted law 
in one country benefits investors, but its counterpart law in the other country harms investors, 
arbitrage may exist. However, this arbitrage opportunity could only exist theoretically since if 
investors could trade on it, it would disappear quickly. 
Besides legal barriers, other factors that may also influence the existence of arbitrage 
opportunities in cross-listed stocks, such as corporate disclosure, are considered in this paper. 
Through inter-listing, a company subjects itself to more than one information disclosure re-
gime, which may make information release more efficient. As a result, the market quotes re-
flect more material information, and arbitrage opportunities are reduced. To sum up, with 
cross-listing, the influence of corporate disclosure will likely decrease the number of arbi-
trages of domestic firms. 
In reality, legal barriers and corporate disclosure may both impact stock prices. They 
move the likelihood of arbitrage opportunities in opposite directions. If the impact of legal 
barriers overwhelms the impact of corporate disclosure, arbitrages in multiple listings should 
be more likely than that of purely-domestic listings, and vice versa. We address this as an 
empirical question. In our paper, cross-border violations of put-call parity such as buying a 
stock in the US and selling the equivalent synthetic stock in Canada, or buying an actual 
share in Canada and synthetic shorting in the US are also examined. Cross-border ownership 
and trading in the two countries are legal and stocks denominated in US dollars could be 
converted to Canadian shares without conversion fees. In this case, cross-border trading may 
lead to fewer violations of put-call parity. Our first hypothesis is listed below.  
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference between the arbitrage opportunities con-
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tained in cross-listed stocks and those of purely domestically listed US stocks. 
If we fail to reject Hypothesis 1, (i.e. if the null hypothesis that cross-listed stocks con-
tain more arbitrage opportunities than purely US stocks is rejected), then, as we find, it sug-
gests that legal barriers effects are overwhelmed by the disclosure benefits. This is discussed 
further in the next section. 
3.2 A dominant-satellite relationship between Canadian and US markets 
Although Canada and the US are similar in culture and economies, market informational 
segmentation still exists between them because of certain barriers, such as regulatory con-
straints, technological constraints and costs, corporate internal firewalls, etc. 
Carbade and Silber (1979) found that prices of dual-listed securities in one market may 
follow earlier prices in the other market only partially, with some variance due to the specific 
trading environments. In this case, the price behaviour of one market may not be a perfect 
copy of its counterpart in the other country. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) examined the dif-
ferences of price discovery of multinational stocks and reached a similar conclusion. It was 
echoed by Nuemark et al. (1991) when they investigated price volatility. The possible reasons 
expressed by these authors are: legal regime effects, impact from informed traders who ac-
tively seek arbitrage opportunities in a dual-market setting, and information release concerns. 
For a cross-listed security, the impacts from one country may be different from the counter-
part, thus each market may have a unique influence on price.  
Because of informational impact, the domestic market of an inter-listed stock is more 
likely to be treated as the dominant market. Usually, the company’s headquarter, where most 
important decisions and policies are made, is located in its home country. In addition, the 
majority of its shareholders and management are based in the home country, and it is possible 
to make corporate disclosure more efficiently in the domestic market. Prices in the foreign 
market adjust to the prices in domestic market, possibly with a time lag due to the speed of 
communications. In this case, the home market (the Canadian market in our paper) is ex-
pected to have more impact on price behaviour, so the domestic market should be treated as 
the dominant market. Early empirical evidence from other countries provides support for this 
argument. In empirical research of Israeli stocks cross-listed on the US over-the-counter 
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(OTC) market, Ben-Zion and Lieberman (1996), show that the Israeli market works as the 
leading market, and the US market acts as a satellite. Hauser et al. (1998) concluded that the 
domestic market in their paper, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) contributed more to 
price behaviour than the NYSE. Liberman et al. (1996) employed an error correction model 
and examined trading volume of the two markets when they tested the dominant-satellite re-
lationship. Their findings provided strong evidence of US price reaction to TASE. Grammig 
et al. (2001) investigated price discovery in German stocks multiple-listed in the US, and 
discovered that more than 80% of price discovery occurred domestically. Scholars believed 
that the impact of terrorism and unexpected inflation in Israel could help to explain why Is-
raeli market acted as the dominant market. 
Prior literature about the dominate-satellite relationship for cross-listed Canadian firms 
is mixed. Compared to the Canadian market, the US financial market is more liquid, and in-
vestors prefer to trade on more liquid markets, so managers can decrease the company’s cost 
of capital by increasing the liquidity of their stock. Foerster and Karolyi (1993) examined 
bid-ask spreads, and found that overall trading costs of Canadian stocks have significantly 
decreased after cross-listing. They also pointed out that the transaction costs decrease as a 
result of the large proportion of transactions being made in the US market. Market makers in 
Canada tend to lower transaction costs to attract investors, and compete with the US market. 
Taking advantages of lower cost of capital and large trading volume, the US market seems to 
operate as the dominant market.  
By investigating the feedback on stock prices of inter-listed companies, a body of re-
search supports the claim that in most cases, the US market is the price discovery mechanism 
for cross-listed non-US stocks. Based on the concept of partial market integration, price ad-
justments take place in both markets. This kind of adjustment may be two-sided, so prices in 
the satellite market may move toward earlier prices in the dominant market, while new in-
formation reflected by prices in the satellite market can also influence prices in the dominant 
market. The market with the heavier weight on price influence is considered to be the domi-
nant market. Hasbrouck (1995) found that the US market influences the stock price behaviour 
of dual-listed stocks more than the home market. Pascual et al. (2006) found that the US 
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market had a strong and continuing influence on the prices of inter-listed Spanish stocks.  
According to the empirical results of Chen et al. (2002), stock quotes obtained from one 
market adjust to price changes in the other market, in order to maintain a long-run cointe-
grated relationship. However, perfect cointegration between two countries is seldom estab-
lished in reality because of market frictions and market inefficiency. Small price disparities 
due to slow adjustment occur in co-integrated markets making arbitrage opportunities avail-
able. The core concept of the dominant-satellite relationship is that the market quotes of the 
satellite market react more to their counterparts in the dominant market. Thus, we are more 
likely to find arbitrage in the satellite market. In this paper, we attempt to examine the domi-
nant-satellite relationship by comparing the arbitrage proportions of both US and Canadian 
quotes of cross-listed Canadian securities.  
Hypothesis 2: In terms of cross-listed securities, arbitrage proportions reported in Canadian 
markets are not significantly different from those existing in US markets.  
If we fail to reject Hypothesis 2, then statistic results show that the arbitrage proportions 
of both US and Canadian quotes are not significantly different from each other. Thus the 
claim that the home market (Canadian market in this paper) always acts as the dominant 
market is not valid. Neither of the two markets may dominant the other. 
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4 DATA 
This chapter describes the selection of the sample, collection of the data, and the filters 
used in data cleaning. Section 1 introduces the data of cross-listed sample. The method of 
how to establish a control sample will be introduced in Section 2. The control sample consists 
of industry and performance matched purely US securities.2 
4.1 Cross-listed US and Canadian securities 
4.1.1 Stocks 
The initial sample consisted of 69 companies cross-listed on the TSX and either the 
NYSE or AMEX markets in 2007 (excluding IPOs). The final sample of 29 firms satisfied the 
following criteria: 
a) Firms are listed on the TSX and either on the NYSE or AMEX. 
b) Inter-listed firms have had at least a one-year history of trading in 2007. 
c) They have daily bid and ask quotes, closing prices, and trading volume available from 
the Center for Research Security Prices (CRSP) and the TSX Common Equities data-
base. Canadian stock data is from DataStream and Canadian Financial Markets Re-
search Centre (CFMRC). 
d) They have options trading on the Montreal Exchange (MX) and a US exchange. 
4.1.2 Options 
a) The Canadian trading quote records of the options derived from the underlying stocks 
were obtained from MX. In addition to option details, quotation records contain bid 
and ask prices while trade records contain transaction prices, and trading volume. 
b) US options data was obtained through HistoricalOptionData.com. 
c) The option quotes of the two markets have the same time stamps (4:00 P.M.), which 
makes it possible for the researcher to match option quotes or trades with the corre-
sponding stock quotes. Violations of put-call parity using daily closing prices could 
stem from nonsynchronous prices. 
                                                        
2 Due to data limitation, a well-matched pure domestically-listed Canadian sample cannot be constructed. It 
seems that Canadian firms with options trading on the MX are primarily those that are cross-listed on a US ex-
change. 
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d) The synthetic shares are constructed using near-the-money options with exercise 
prices close to the stock price. In particular, we use both the nearest in the money and 
the nearest out of the money strike prices. 
e) The record dates of all observations within this sample are in 2007. The maturity days 
of this sample are 1-178 days. The options analyzed are short-term (i.e. 1~ 90 days) 
and intermediate-term options (i.e. 91~ 180 days), as longer term options often have 
zero trading volume.  
f) For the analysis, US and Canadian options were matched to make them homogenous 
sets of option pairs. Therefore, only the options with the same record date and expira-
tion date traded in the two countries were kept. 
An analysis of the data set finds there are 57686 options or 28843 pairs for Canadian 
markets, and 38960 options or 19480 pairs for the US markets. Fewer options are traded in 
the US market than those in Canadian market, however, the total option trading volume 
(measured by the number of options traded during a trading day) in the US market is higher 
than that of Canadian market, which we discuss it in more detail in Chapter 6. The final sam-
ple of 29 firms and number of observations (firm-by-firm) are classified in Table 1: 
Insert Table 1 about here 
According to the regulations issued by NYSE, the cross-listed Canadian stocks must 
meet the minimum standards of earnings, market capitalizations and share distribution. No 
less than $500 million in market capitalization and minimum $25 million operating income 
per year are required. It suggests that only those well-operated large companies are qualified, 
which could introduce a bias. 
4.1.3 Dividends 
Among the 29 firms listed in Table 1, 8 do not pay dividends. The remaining 21 firms 
have complete dividend payment records in 2007. The Canadian dividend information in-
cluding the dividend amount and ex-dividend date are accessible from CFMRC. Dividend 
information in US market is accessible in CRSP for all 29 firms. The value of dividend is set 
to be zero for non-dividend paying companies. 
4.1.4 Interest rates 
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London Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR) are used as the risk-free interest rate determi-
nant in this paper. LIBOR in US dollars and LIBOR in Canadian dollars for 2007 are ob-
tained from the British Banker’s Association (BBA) website http://www.bba.org.uk. 
4.1.5 Exchange rates 
Daily exchange rates are used to translate shares in one country into their counterparts in 
the other country, when we examine cross-border violations of put-call parity. The daily ex-
change rates for the US and Canadian currencies are obtained from Bank of Canada 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/exchange.html     
4.2 The US securities only listed and traded in domestic market (Purely US Sample) 
 Although the listing requirements for the US companies are not as strict as those for 
non-US firms, certain criteria must be satisfied. For example, aggregate cash flow for last 3 
years should be no less than $25 million, and the fiscal amount for each individual year 
should be positive. Meanwhile, a minimum $500 million market capitalization requirement 
should be met or exceeded. In addition, firms selected to consist of the purely US listed sam-
ple must have associated options available. It seems that mostly larger enterprises have op-
tions available, so this sample may share the large firm bias of the cross-listed sample. 
4.2.1 Stocks 
In order to make a comparison of arbitrage opportunities between cross-listed stocks and 
domestically listed stocks, the research design requires a control sample of 29 companies that 
are subject to the following constraints: 
a) All the 29 firms are listed only on the NYSE.3 
b) These firms have at least a one-year trading record. 
c) A purely US firm is matched to a corresponding inter-listed Canadian firm that is 
identified within the same industry. The industry is classified by NYSE. 
d) All purely US domestic-listed firms identified in above 3 steps are matched to other 
dual-listed Canadian firms that have a similar Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is a measure of firm 
performance and market power, and the theoretical value should be calculated by the 
                                                        
3 The initial data of control sample is collected from CRSP, in which firms listed on either NYSE or AMEX are 
included. However, the firms qualified for our control sample, with the closest Tobin’s q, are all listed on the 
NYSE. 
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formula ݍכ ൌ ௠௔௥௞௘௧ ௩௔௟௨௘ ௢௙ ௔௦௦௘௧௦
௥௘௣௟௔௖௘௠௘௡௧ ௖௢௦௧ ௢௙ ௔௦௦௘௧௦
 (see Tobin 1969).4 Here, we adopt the value of 
ݍ ൌ ௠௔௥௞௘௧ ௖௔௣௜௧௔௟௜௭௔௧௜௢௡ା௕௢௢௞ ௩௔௟௨௘ ௢௙ ௟௜௔௕௜௟௜௧௜௘௦
௕௢௢௞ ௩௔௟௨௘ ௢௙ ௔௦௦௘௧௦
 as a proxy of Tobin’s q (see for example 
Moeller et al., 2004). Firms in the same industry with the closest Tobin’s q are included in 
our matching sample; in each case the value of Tobin’s q of the control firm is within ±30% 
of the value of Tobin’s q of its counterpart.5 The mean and standard deviation of the 
variation are –1.1% and 18.6%, respectively. Theoretically, if Tobin’s q is above 1, it 
shows that the firm operates well and earns a high return on capital investment. A high 
Tobin’s q is usually considered as a signal that the firm’s growth rate is high. If Tobin’s q 
is below 1, it is usually a negative signal for investors that the firm suffers from poor in-
vestment, with a low growth rate. 
e) The records of these firms such as closing prices and dividend payment information 
are retrieved from CRSP. 
f) These firms have option trading records in 2007. 
The details of the control sample matched by industry and Tobin’s q are shown in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
4.2.2 Options  
a) All the option records are provided by HistoricalOptionData.com. 
b) To compare them with the cross-listed sample, options in the purely US sample satis-
fied the same criteria as their counterparts, that is, they are all nearest in- and 
out-of-the-money options, the record dates are within 2007, with their maturities no 
longer than 180 days. 
Table 2: Panel B shows the 29 firms comprising the purely US sample. Descriptive statis-
tics of maturities and trading volumes of call and put options are given in Table 3, sorted by 
subsamples. 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
                                                        
4 The values of market capitalization are obtained from CRSP, and data of Dec 31, 2007 is used. The book val-
ues of assets and liabilities are collected from the firms’ annual report for 2007. 
5 Many existing studies use the same range of ±30% to match samples. Chen et al. (2006) and Summers and 
Sweeney (1998) employed a ±30% range to establish their control samples. 
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5 METHODOLOGIES 
This chapter is designed to explain the methodology used in deriving the results. It dis-
cusses the upper and lower bounds for stock prices, derived from put-call parity. The two 
inequalities provide the rational range for stock prices (given option prices). If either of the 
two inequalities is not satisfied, arbitrage may exist. In addition, put-call parity is also exam-
ined in a cross-border situation.   
Upper and lower bounds for stock prices are derived and shown in this chapter. If the ac-
tual share price violates upper or lower bounds, arbitrage may exist.  
The following notation is used: 
C(bid): bid price of a call option 
P(bid): bid price of a put option 
C(ask): ask price of a call option 
P(ask): ask price of a put option 
ܵ௧: spot price of a stock 
K: strike price of an option 
࣌: implied volatility of an option 
Margrabe (1978) derived the put-call parity theorem for American options, and a pricing 
model for European options. In this paper, we develop the put-call parity and test on 
cross-listed securities, based on Canadian and U.S. cases. 
The put-call parity bounds for American options can be found in most standard deriva-
tives securities texts (such as Hull, 2008). This relationship is described as follows 
S – PV[div] – K ≤ C – P ≤ S – PV[K] (5.1)
where S is the stock price, PV [div] is the present value of all (assumed to be known with 
certainty) dividends payable prior to (or on) the common expiration time for the put and call, 
K is the common strike price, C is the call price and P is the put price of options with a com-
mon underlying asset, strike price, and expiration time. Rearranging this equation and insert-
ing notation for ask or bid prices gives the following two candidate put-call parity bounds: 
S(bid) – PV[div] – K – C(ask) + P(bid) ≤ 0, (5.2)
C(bid) – P(ask) – S(ask) + PV[K] ≤ 0. (5.3)
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To prove inequality (5.2), consider the portfolio in which stocks are sold short, PV[div] + K is 
lent at the risk-free rate, the call is bought, and the put is written. Since buying is conducted 
at the ask and selling at the bid, this initial cash inflow (outflow if negative) from this portfo-
lio is S (bid) – PV[div] – K – C (ask) + P (bid). 
Suppose this portfolio is held until the put is exercised against it, at which time there will 
be an obligation to buy the stock for K, or otherwise hold until expiration. First, consider the 
case when the put is exercised at time τ, assuming this is after the (last) ex-dividend date, 
PV[div] grows to div, which is withdrawn to pay the dividend obligations of the short sell. 
Furthermore, K grows to FV[K] ≥ K, which is used to pay the strike price to buy the stock as 
required by the put contract. This closes out the short position in the stock. Finally, the call 
option is sold for Cτ(bid) ≥ 0, for a net inflow of FV[K] – K + Cτ(bid) ≥ 0. If the put is exer-
cised prior to the (last) ex-dividend date, then FV[PV[div]] ≥ 0 is received; the obligation to 
pay the dividend does not exist anymore. 
Consider the case when the put is never exercised, hence it expires out of the money. 
Again, use the investment of PV[div] to pay the dividend obligations of the short sell. Since 
the put is out of the money, the call will be in the money. Exercise it by withdrawing FV[K] 
and paying K to buy the stock. This closes out the short position in the stock, leaving a net 
inflow of FV[K] – K ≥ 0. 
Since these two cases exhaust all possibilities, and since both have non-negative future 
value, to avoid arbitrage the initial value of the portfolio must be non-negative; thus, the ini-
tial cash inflow must have been non-positive. 
To prove inequality (5.3), a portfolio is created by selling the call, buying the put, bor-
rowing PV[K], and buying the stock. The initial cash inflow from this portfolio is C(bid) – 
P(ask) – S(ask) + PV[K]. The portfolio is held until the call is exercised, at which time the 
stock should be sold for K, or until it expires.  
Assume the call option is exercised at time τ, so the put must be out of the money. The 
payment is received by selling the stock at strike price K. In the mean time, principle and in-
terest of PV[K] should be repaid, which is FV[PV[K]] ≤ K at time τ. To close out all our posi-
tion, we sell the put for P(bid) ≥ 0, then, including the possibility of receiving a dividend, the 
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net inflow of K – FV[PV[K]] + P(bid) + FV[div] ≥ 0. 
 If the call expires out of the money, the put must be in the money. At the maturity, we 
exercise the put by selling the stock for K. Moreover, PV[K] grows to K, and we must repay 
the interest and principle, which offset the price in which the stock was sold. Accounting for 
any dividends paid, the final cash inflow should be FV[div] ≥ 0. 
Both cases have non-negative future values. To avoid arbitrage, the initial value of the 
portfolio must be non-negative, which leads to a non-positive initial cash inflow. Thus, C(bid) 
– P(ask) – S(ask) + PV[K] ≤ 0 holds. 
If any quotes fall outside the bounds derived above, then arbitrage may exist. Arbi2 de-
notes that an arbitrage comes from Inequality (5.2); similarly, arbitrage opportunities derived 
from Inequality (5.3) are called Arbi3.  
In this paper, cross-border violations of put-call parity are also examined. It is possible 
for investors to buy a stock in the US market and sell the equivalent synthetic share in the 
Canadian market, or hold an actual Canadian stock and synthetic short in US. The upper and 
lower bounds for stocks are modified to mimic a cross-border trading. 
S f(bid) – PV[div f] – K – C(ask) + P(bid) ≤ 0, (5.4)
C(bid) – P(ask) – S f(ask) + PV[K] ≤ 0. (5.5)
S f(bid) denotes for foreign bid price of the stock which is translated into local currency. 
For the cross-border Canadian sample, S f(bid) equals to S(bid) × CAD/USD, where S(bid) 
represents bid price obtained from NYSE. Similarly, div f is the translated dividend amount 
collected from foreign country. However, for dual-listed Canadian stocks, dividend could be 
paid either in Canadian or US dollars, equal in value after currency conversion, so div f and 
div should be identical. S f(ask) stands for the converted ask price posted in foreign market. 
Concerning the cross-listed US sample, S f(bid) refers to S(bid) / (CAD/USD), as S(bid) is the 
US quote and should be translated into Canadian dollars. Arbitrage derived from Inequality 
(5.4) is labelled as Arbi4, while Arbi5 refers to arbitrage opportunities generated from Ine-
quality (5.5). Results are presented in Chapter 6.  
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6 RESULTS & ANALYSES 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the tests that were carried out on 
cross-listed samples and the purely U.S. sample. These arbitrage opportunities are derived 
from upper and lower bounds for stock prices. Section 6.1 discusses the arbitrage opportuni-
ties reported from the cross-listed Canadian sample. Section 6.2 presents the arbitrage exist-
ing in the dual-listed U.S. sample, and arbitrage in the control sample is discussed in Section 
6.3. 
6. 1 Arbitrage existing in the cross-listed Canadian sample  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 presents the arbitrages obtained from inequalities (5.2), (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5). 
Based on notations given in the methodology section, the variables arbi2(%), arbi3(%), 
arbi4(%), and arbi5(%) represent the arbitrage proportion of each stock, in percentage.  
arbi2ሺ%ሻ ൌ
Arbi2
obs
 (6.1.1)
arbi3ሺ%ሻ ൌ
Arbi3
obs
 (6.1.2)
arbi4ሺ%ሻ ൌ
Arbi4
obs
 (6.1.3)
arbi5ሺ%ሻ ൌ
Arbi5
obs
 (6.1.4)
The arithmetic means of arbi2(%), arbi3(%), arbi4(%) and arbi5(%) reported in Table 4 
are 0.13%, 0.55%, 0.13% and 0.19%, respectively. Results of statistic tests show that all arbi-
trage proportions are not significantly different from zero, at 5% significance level. After 
examining the results, we find that the observations of each stock are quite different, in other 
words each stock contributes different weights to the entire sample. To make results more 
robust to outliers, the observation-weighted average numbers of these arbitrage percentages 
are also considered. The weight on each stock equals the proportion of its observations to the 
total observations of the entire sample. Here, the weighted average numbers are given as 
0.12%, 0.17%, 0.11%, and 0.07% for arbi2(%) to arbi5(%) respectively, and they are not sig-
nificantly different from zero at 5% significance level. The numbers above and the results of 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U tests show that the number of violations due to short selling re-
strictions (Equation (2.3.2)) is not greater than the number of violations generated from the 
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opposite inequality. Thus, the argument that violations of put-call parity should be prevalent 
in only one direction does not hold. 
The results shown in Panel A and Panel B of Tables 4 suggest that both the upper and 
lower bounds of stock prices hold well in cross-listed Canadian samples. Less than 1% of the 
28843 observations provide arbitrage opportunities. In most circumstances, the Canadian 
quotes are priced fairly based on put-call parity. 
6. 2 Arbitrage opportunities existing in the cross-listed US sample 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 Table 5 Panel A shows that only a few arbitrage opportunities are reported in the 
cross-listed US sample. When transactions were made within one country, only 6 observa-
tions contain arbitrage opportunities out of 19480 records. The empirical results of Table 5 
Panel B show that fewer than 1% of the cross-border put-call parity observations were found 
were found to provide arbitrage opportunities in cross-listed US sample. Generally, put-call 
parity holds very well in this sub-sample. 
6. 3 Arbitrage opportunities existing in the purely US sample 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
The findings for the purely US sample are very similar to the cross-listed US sample. 
The weighted average of arbi2(%) and arbi3(%) are 0.01% and 0.03%, respectively. These 
arbitrage proportions are very slim and very close to the values of the cross-listed US sample, 
which indicates that both of the upper and lower bounds for all US quotes are not violated. 
However, we fail to conclude that there is significant difference in these arbitrage proportions 
at 5% significance level,6 because the arbitrage proportions of all three samples are close to 
zero. Generally, the empirical results show that stocks are priced properly, regardless of their 
location. It seems that the US control sample does not contain fewer arbitrage opportunities, 
compared to the other two cross-border listed samples. Thus, we fail to reject Hypothesis 1 
and draw a conclusion that cross-listing activities do not bring more arbitrage opportunities. 
                                                        
6 As our data is not normally distributed, we employ a non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test. We fail 
to find a significant difference in the proportion of arbitrage opportunities between the cross-listed sample and 
the US control sample (the p-value of the two-sided test is 0.062). Based on the results of the two-sided tests, we 
fail to reject the hypothesis that the arbitrage proportion of the inter-listed Canadian sample is not significantly 
different from that of the inter-listed US sample (the p-value equals to 0.944). 
  
24 
 
Although the mean values of arbitrage percentage in the inter-listed Canadian sample 
contain are slightly less than those of the inter-listed US quotes, there is not sufficient evi-
dence suggesting that the number of arbitrage opportunities in the inter-listed Canadian sam-
ple is statistically less than the number of arbitrage opportunities generated from the in-
ter-listed U.S. sample, when we adopt Wilxocon-Mann-Whitney U tests. Hence, we fail to 
reject Hypothesis 2.  
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7 Robustness Check 
In this chapter, we examine whether the results about the comparison of arbitrage per-
centages are robust. The potential reasons behind them are provided in the first section. Then, 
we relax the near-the-money restriction and allow all options to apply, so long as they have 
some trading volume in order to help rule out stale quotes. The arbitrage results of the full 
sample are presented in Section 2. 
7.1 Robustness of arbitrage opportunities  
7.1 .1 Arbitrage opportunities sorted by date 
After examining the arbitrage opportunities that result from violating the upper and lower 
bounds for stock prices, we try to discover the reasons behind them, as part of a robustness 
check. We find that arbitrage opportunities in the cross-listed Canadian sample show a unique 
pattern when there are listed by date. Tables 4, 5 and 6 report these arbitrage proportions by 
firm, while Table 7 sorts them by date. 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
Table 7 Panel A shows that a number of arbitrage opportunities in cross-listed Canadian 
sample are concentrated on a single day, March 14, 2007, while arbitrage occurred sporadi-
cally on other trading days. However, Panels B and C show that the US market does not have 
this feature of a large number of arbitrage opportunities occurring on a particular day. 
7.1.2 Market shocks in the first quarter of 2007 
Why is the day March 14, 2007 so peculiar? Figure 1-1 presents the general trend of the 
S&P 500 in 2007, and the corresponding price movements are captured by Figure 2. As an 
indicator of the US stock market, the S&P 500 suffered two severe intraday price drops in the 
first quarter: one on February 27, 2007 (–3.47%), and the other on March 13, 2007 (–2.04%). 
The first sharp drop coincided with Black Tuesday of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. On 
February 27, 2007 the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index declined around 9% in a 
single day, and the world market may have been affected by the dramatic turndown. Powell 
(2007) pointed out that this price crash was trigged by rumours that the Chinese government 
was going to increase the interest rate to control inflation. Many Wall Street analysts may 
have worried about the effects of the slowdown in the Chinese economy. Former Federal Re-
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serve Chairman Alan Greenspan predicted a US recession in 2007. Consequently, orders of 
durable goods fell along with stock prices. Tokic (2007) examined the integration between 
Asia and the rest of the world, and the author pointed out the February Chinese stock market 
drop largely slowed down the rest of the world. 
Based on the market report, on February 27, the Dow Jones industrial average fell 416.02 
points, the biggest one day loss since 2001, while the S&P 500 dropped 3.5% that day. The 
crash was copied by other countries. For instance, the NIKKEI tumbled 2.9%, and Singapore 
Stock Index slipped 3.7%. The price drop lasted for about a week. 
The second sharp worldwide decline started with the NYSE on March 13, 2007, after 5 
days of climbing. The Dow Jones industrial average fell more than 57 points during the first 
trading hours, and then suffered a one day loss of 1.97%. The broader indicator, S&P 500 
dropped more than 2% that day. Financial companies led the way down in index points. The 
first shock came from New Century Financial Corp, one of the largest subprime lenders in the 
US, as the company disclosed its severe financial distress along with the rising default rates. 
The steep fall was widespread in the financial sector. The weak open that day caused Wall 
Street investors to sell off the subprime mortgage market. The fear was fuelled by a report 
issued by the Mortgage Bankers Association on mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures for 
late 2006 (see Krinsman, 2007). 
Subprime mortgages are mortgage loans granted to poor-credit borrowers. Because of the 
borrowers’ poor credit records, these mortgages are treated as high risk loans. Reinhart et al. 
(2008) pointed out that the number of subprime mortgages increased sharply in the US start-
ing in 2003. In 2006, around 20% of mortgage loans were subprime. However, according to a 
report by Inside Mortgage Finance, about 80% of those subprime loans were given as adjust-
able-rate mortgages. These adjustable rate mortgages usually require no down payment, and 
begin with an interest rate below the market rate. After the introductory period, the interest 
rate is adjusted up about 5% per year. Adjustable rate mortgages offer low credit borrowers a 
free call option on the real estate asset. If housing prices keep going up, the option is in the 
money. During the introductory period, the monthly payment is not sufficient to pay back ei-
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ther principal or interest. Investors are willing to make monthly payments to keep this valu-
able call option, because they are speculating the property will appreciate. 
By the latter half of 2006, the marginal unit of loan in the US facilitated the formation 
mentioned above, which is called the Ponzi phase in Minsky (2008). Minsky (2008) argued 
that a stable economy journeys from a hedging phase, a speculative phase, and then a Ponzi 
phase to instability. In early 2007, beyond most investors’ expectations, the US housing mar-
ket slowed down, and the prices declined. The subprime borrowers found that their properties 
depreciated, and the call option granted by the subprime mortgages was no longer valuable. 
Thus, they refused to make monthly payments, which resulted in an increase in the default 
rate. The sudden increase in defaults, delinquencies, and foreclosures made more than 24 fi-
nancial companies face financial hurdles, and caused the US market to slip sharply on March 
13, 2007, after five days of climbing. 
Figure 3 illustrates the index price movements of the S&P/TSX composite index from 
the Canadian market and the Dow Jones industrial average from the US market. From the 
figure above, it is clear that the price movements in the two markets followed a similar pat-
tern, which supports the argument that the integration level between Canadian and the US is 
high. With enhanced market globalization, the economic tie between countries becomes 
tighter. Extensive research supported this argument. After investigating real interest rates in 
several countries, Rodrik (2000) suggested that the world integration level has improved sig-
nificantly. Perraton and Goldblatt (1997) analyzed multinational bank business and supported 
that the economic ties become tighter. Matsuyama (2004) examined the capital flows between 
rich countries and poor countries, and indicated that there is a rise in financial market global-
isation. In this paper, the cointegration issue between the Canadian and US markets is also 
examined, because if the integration level is low, price discrepancies between the two coun-
tries may lead more arbitrage opportunities. Cointegration means that two price series are 
economically linked or follow the same trend in the long run, but we only deal with one-year 
data in this paper. The two price series the Dow Jones Industrial average and the S&P/TSX 
contain a unit root and they are I(1): the original prices are both nonstationary, but their 
changes are stationary. The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) tests and Philips 
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(1987) and Perron(1988) tests shows that the error term from regressing the Dow Jones In-
dustrial average on S&P/TSX is covariance stationary, so generally speaking, the stock prices 
in the two countries are cointegrated. The US, Canada’s biggest trading partner, absorbs 80% 
of Canada’s exports. Most of the Canadian companies, especially metal and energy compa-
nies were directly affected by the US economy. That is why the two stock price crashes in the 
first quarter of 2007 not only happened in the US market but also in Canadian market. Due to 
the importance of the US to the Canadian economy, the sharp drop of the stock prices in the 
US market on March 13, 2007 sent the S&P/TSX composite index tumbling 255.55 points, or 
2% in a single day. Among all Canadian firms, blue-chip companies, especially resource 
based companies reported a greater loss that day.  
Table 8 presents the price drops of eight Canadian leading companies on March 13, 2007. 
Bloomberg summarised the market reactions of these blue-chip companies dual-listed in 
NYSE. Barrick Gold Corp., the nation’s biggest precious metal producer, lost 3% in one day. 
Nortel Networks Corp. retreated more than 1.5 Canadian dollars (4.5%). Canadian oil and gas 
producers also posted a great loss that day: Suncor Energy, one of the largest oil sands pro-
ducers, dropped 2.5%; while Talisman Energy Inc. slipped 1.8%. The banking system is also 
a victim of the worry of subprime mortgage lending in the US, the Royal Bank of Canada, as 
well as Toronto-Dominion Bank reported more than 1% losses. 
 Table 7 Panel A shows that on March 14, 2007, 64 arbitrage opportunities are found 
among the 88 arbitrage opportunities observed in all of 2007. Figure 1 and Figure 3 show that 
there was a difference in the price changes existing between the two countries. In general, the 
US market rebounded the day following the price crash, that is, March 14, 2007, while the 
Canadian market took another day to recover. It seems that an adjustment delay exists in 
Canada, and the price movement discrepancy may be responsible for the arbitrage opportuni-
ties in the Canadian sample. Quan (1999) supported our claim. The author investigated the 
stock returns in Canada and the US, and concluded that there is a positive relationship be-
tween the stock returns of the two countries. Moreover, they found the Canadian stock prices 
are positively related to the US prices, with a time lag. 
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Furthermore, we found that around three quarters of these arbitrage opportunities came 
from leading companies (see Figure 4). It seems that the arbitrage opportunities are more 
likely to be found among companies that were directly influenced by the sudden shock and 
who suffered more than their peers.  
We also examine the price behaviour of the two markets in March 14, 2007. Table 9 pre-
sents the stock price movements in the two countries. If the prices move in the same direction 
in the two countries (price rebounded in both markets or dropped together), we record the 
price changes as having positive co-movement (+); if not, then we consider the prices 
changes to have negative (or no) co-movement (–). We find that almost all violations of 
put-call parity are reported in those firms with negative co-movement. The stock price dis-
parities of the two countries may help us to explain the violations of cross-border put-call 
parity.  
7.1.3 Cause of arbitrage formation on March 13, 2007  
As shown in Table 7, we fail to find the arbitrage concentration phenomenon in the US 
market from Panels B and C. Why did put call parity survive in the US, but fail in Canada?  
On March 13, 2007, prices in the US stock market and Canadian markets fell sharply af-
ter New Century’s announcement. In an efficient market, stock and option prices should 
quickly react to the new shock. Sabherwal (2007) indicated that there is a positive relation-
ship between the speed at which market quotes absorb fresh information and the number of 
analysts and active traders in the market, while the numbers of analysts and investors in the 
United States and Canada are related to the trading volume of dual-listed Canadian firms in 
the two markets. Comparing the trading volume in the two markets, the author draws a con-
clusion that the majority of analysts and investors rely on US markets and the US market re-
acts to new information more quickly than Canada. 
According to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), arbitrage transactions could be im-
peded by low trading volume. Figure 5 shows that for most of the 29 firms, the trading vo-
lume of options in the US markets is greater than that in Canadian markets, which has been 
supported by empirical evidence of one-sided tests (Table 10). When new information comes, 
both stock prices and option prices adjust. The different market structure of stock markets and 
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option markets may lead to a temporary price violation of put-call parity. The US markets, 
with sufficient liquidity, allow traders and investors to make arbitrage transactions when arbi-
trage opportunities appear. Active investors and traders drive the prices back to their rational 
range by taking arbitrage transactions, and then arbitrage disappears. However, the Canadian 
market, is not as liquid as the US market, it may not be possible to take advantage of all arbi-
trage transactions in the Canadian market, especially in the option markets. In this paper, 
daily closing prices are used rather than intraday data. It is possible that arbitrage opportuni-
ties exist in the intraday observations in both markets. In the US markets, any mispricing is 
fixed by arbitrage transactions during trading hours, so put-call parity holds well at the end of 
the day. On the other hand, there may not be enough arbitrage transactions taking place in the 
Canadian market, so several arbitrage opportunities last until close. Unfortunately, without 
intraday data, the argument above is speculation.  
Why did the arbitrage concentration phenomenon only occur on March 14, 2007? Figure 
6 presents the 10 biggest stock price drops in the Canadian market in 2007. The stock prices 
on March 14, 2007, one day after the second stock crash, still followed a downward trend. A 
steady climbing started from March 15. This stock slump was right after another stock price 
decline two weeks earlier. A large number of analysts and active investors in Canada were 
still dealing with the disorder that is caused by the previous shock. When market shocks came 
in rapid succession, the number of analysts and the liquidity of the Canadian market may curb 
its capacity of arbitrage transactions. The time line of the 10 biggest drops in the Canadian 
market in 2007 sounds in consistent with our explanation, as the time interval between the 
first two prices drops is the shortest one (Figure 7). The longer time interval may provide 
analysts and investors enough time to exploit all mispricing and then make appropriate arbi-
trage transactions. This claim has been supported by some behavioural finance experts. As 
the former vice-chairman of Fidelity's Investment, Peter Lynch said, “The key to making 
money in stocks is not to get scared out of them.” The high market volatility within a short 
time period will lead to media speculation. In a special market climate, both investors and 
market makers become more risk averse. Some investors could over-react to the market 
shocks and withdraw their savings from security markets and make more conservative in-
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vestments. Market makers could also cut their inventories to avoid inventory risk when mar-
ket volatility is high. Thus, if the time interval between market shocks is short, both investors 
and market makers avoid taking transactions. Without enough arbitrage transactions, mis-
pricing could not be fixed completely during trading hours, so arbitrage opportunities could 
be detected in closing prices.  
Chordia et al. (2005) found that market liquidity shrinks during crisis periods. Thus, 
there may not be enough arbitrage transactions taking place to drive prices back to their 
no-arbitrage level. Figure 8 supports this claim. We examine the option trading volume dur-
ing market crash, and find that fewer option transactions took place during the 10 biggest 
price declines, compared to their corresponding monthly average trading volume. Statistical 
support is shown in Table 11. It shows that trading volume is inversely related to market 
volatility. It takes time for investors and market makers to recover confidence and increase 
trading volume. If another shock occurs during the recovery period, there may not be enough 
transactions in the market to eliminate arbitrage opportunities. A longer time interval between 
market shocks could provide enough room for confidence to recover, which may help put-call 
parity hold well and fewer arbitrage opportunities to be observed in closing prices.  
7.2 Robustness check by adopting full sample 
As we mentioned in Chapter 4, the options employed to establish put-call parity are all 
near-the-money options. After examining the trading volume of raw data, we found that those 
near-the-money options are more actively traded than other options left in the data set. Ac-
cording to Sadka (2003), low trading volume may impede arbitrage transactions. It is possible 
that those less-liquid options would retain some arbitrage opportunities. To address this issue, 
we perform a robustness check by relaxing the near-the-money restrictions and including 
non-near-the-money options with positive trading volume in all three samples. The sample 
size of cross-listed Canadian sample expands from 28842 to 30625. The full sample of 
cross-listed US sample contains 35854 records, and there are 37838 observations in the 
purely US sample. The descriptive statistics of the three full samples are given in Table 12. 
The average trading volumes, for both call and put options, decline in the full samples. First, 
we check whether these outlier options drive our main results. Overall, there is no qualitative 
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change in arbitrage opportunities reported in the three samples. There are very few violations 
of the upper and lower bounds of stock prices reporting in either cross-listed US sample or 
purely US sample. It seems that put-call parity holds very well in the US market. Furthermore, 
Table 13 shows that less than 1% of the observations allow arbitrage in the cross-listed Cana-
dian sample. Generally speaking, put-call parity works well in all three full samples. 
We also examine the robustness of the arbitrage concentration phenomenon. The empiri-
cal results are given in Table 16. About 70% of the observations on March 14, 2007 contain 
arbitrage, while arbitrage opportunities occur only occasionally on other days. The numbers 
in Panel B and Panel C in Table 16 show similar results to Table 7. Thus, the arbitrage con-
centration is robust when the near-the-money restriction is relaxed. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS & LIMITATIONS 
We examine arbitrage opportunities in the Canadian and US markets for Canadian 
cross-listed stocks arising from violations of upper and lower bounds for American-style op-
tion put-call parity. To investigate the cross-listing effect on arbitrage opportunities, we also 
consider an industry-matched comparison sample composed of purely US stocks. Moreover, 
inter-listed Canadian quotes are distinguished from their US counterparts to analyze the rela-
tionship between dominant and satellite countries.  
According to the results from both upper and lower bounds, arbitrage opportunities in 
the inter-listed Canadian sample are very rare, and those arising in the cross-border listed US 
samples are even more, while the control samples reports rare arbitrage opportunities. More-
over, the difference in arbitrage proportions between cross-listed samples and the control 
sample is not significant. Accordingly, our first hypothesis that cross-listings allow more ar-
bitrage than domestically listed stocks should be rejected. Likewise, the comparison between 
cross-listed US quotes and Canadian quotes suggests that put-call parity holds well in both 
countries. 
However, we do find an outlier with several arbitrage opportunities available on March 
14, 2007. The integration relationship between Canada and the US has been supported in this 
study. The market of one country could be affected by material information from other coun-
tries. Conversely, the movements in one country could influence the price behaviour of other 
countries. When a particular event happens, price adjustments take place in all related mar-
kets, and the reaction speed is related to the market efficiency and liquidity. The Canadian 
market reaction to the stock price slump in March was slightly different from the US It 
sounds reasonable that segmentation still exists between Canada and the US, which is con-
sistent with the semi-integration relationship between Canada and the US advocated in pre-
vious studies. Due to the segmentation, the price disparities after a crash may result in arbi-
trage in Canada. Based on our methodology, arbitrage opportunities exist if either the upper 
or the lower bounds for stock prices (as determined by put-call parity) are violated. If the 
stock price lies above the upper bound, that is, the stock is overpriced relative to options, in-
vestors may benefit from buying a call, writing a put, lending the present value of the divi-
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dend, and selling the stock. Likewise, it is possible to earn profit by taking an advantage of a 
relatively underpriced stock. To construct a profitable transaction, investors write a call, long 
a corresponding put and borrow the cash amount equals to the present value of the option’s 
exercise price. In that case, a net cash inflow is guaranteed. After taking these transactions, 
arbitrage opportunities disappear and the stock prices are driven back to their normal level. 
After investigation of option trading volumes, we find that there were fewer transactions 
made in Canada than in the US, and during stock market crashes, the option trading volume 
dropped below average in 2007. With insufficient trading, mispricing could be captured in the 
closing quotes.  
Clearly, our study has a number of limitations. Based on our methodology, arbitrage 
came from the disparity of stock and option prices. According to the empirical evidence, on 
March 14, 2007 most arbitrage is reported in the Canadian companies whose stock prices 
moved in opposite directions in the two countries. However, if both Canadian stock and op-
tion market movements differed equally from the US quotes, there would be no violations of 
put call parity. Without intraday data, the analysis of this observation is limited, and the im-
pact of some factors may remain undetected. Another drawback is that our study does not in-
clude a pure Canadian control sample. A well-matched pure domestically-listed Canadian 
sample would help us to investigate the relationship between cross-border listings and viola-
tions of put-call parity. Unfortunately for this analysis, primarily the same firms that have 
liquid option trading are also cross-listed, so a relevant purely Canadian sample cannot be 
constructed. 
In addition, the exchange rates we adopt for examining cross-border put-call parity are 
mid-market rates, rather than the bid and ask quotes. It is possible that the arbitrage propor-
tions of the two cross-listed samples change if the bid and ask quotes of exchange rates are 
used. However, Bali and Yilmaz (2008) found that the bid-ask spreads in the CAD/USD for-
eign exchange markets, with an average value of 0.004 US dollars, is quite small in recent 
years. According to Ellul et. al (2007), the average bid-ask spread on US stock market from 
2002 to 2007 is reported to be 0.0523 US dollars. Mayhew (2002) found that the bid-ask 
spreads in option markets are slightly smaller than that of stock markets, and the value given 
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in his paper is around 0.045 US dollars. Thus, the bid-ask spreads in the CAD/USD foreign 
exchange market is relatively smaller, compared to the bid-ask spreads in stock and option 
markets, so the results of our cross-border put-call parity examination are likely still quite 
reliable.  
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APPENDIX  
Table 1: 29 firms composed of cross-border samples 
This table displays the company information of 29 cross-listed firms that were dual-listed in both the U.S. and 
Canadian markets in 2007. The numbers of observations obtained from both markets are also shown in this ta-
ble. 
Symbol Company name Industry Exchange 
CA 
(obs.) 
U.S.(obs.) 
ABX Barrick Gold Corporation Gold Mining NYSE/TSX 3085 1731 
AEM Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited Gold Mining NYSE/TSX 1977 1198 
AGU Agrium Inc. Specialty Chemicals NYSE/TSX 1053 775 
BCE BCE Inc. Fixed Line Telecommunications NYSE/TSX 104 112 
BVF Biovail Corporation Pharmaceuticals NYSE/TSX 538 431 
CLS Celestica Inc. 
Electrical Components and Equip-
ment 
NYSE/TSX 
26 25 
CNQ 
Canadian Natural Resources Lim-
ited 
Exploration and Production NYSE/TSX 
1897 1538 
CP Canadian Pacific Railway Limited Railroads NYSE/TSX 268 230 
ECA EnCana Corporation Exploration and Production NYSE/TSX 1997 1985 
ENB Enbridge Inc. Gas Distribution NYSE/TSX 15 15 
ERF Enerplus Resources Fund Exploration and Production NYSE/TSX 149 117 
FDG Fording Canadian Coal Trust Coal NYSE/TSX 530 374 
FFH Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited Property and Casualty Insurance NYSE/TSX 7 7 
IMO Imperial Oil Limited Oil and Gas Extraction AMEX/TSX 126 134 
IVN Ivanhoe Mines Limited Nonferrous Metals NYSE/TSX 143 129 
NCX Nova Chemicals Corporation Commodity Chemicals NYSE/TSX 207 204 
NG NovaGold Resources, Inc., Metals Mining AMEX/TSX 85 51 
NT Nortel Networks Corporation Telecommunications Equipment NYSE/TSX 1245 1245 
NXY Nexen Inc. Exploration and Production NYSE/TSX 714 682 
POT 
Potash Corporation of Saskatche-
wan Inc. 
Specialty Chemicals NYSE/TSX 
6627 1582 
RY Royal Bank of Canada Banks NYSE/TSX 537 735 
SLF Sun Life Financial Inc. Life Insurance NYSE/TSX 31 36 
SLW Silver Wheaton Corp. Platinum and Precious Metals NYSE/TSX 830 657 
SU Suncor Energy Inc. Integrated Oil and Gas NYSE/TSX 3971 1872 
TCK Teck Cominco Limited Nonferrous Metals NYSE/TSX 1131 1782 
TD The Toronto-Dominion Bank Banks NYSE/TSX 440 630 
THI Tim Hortons Inc. Restaurants and Bars NYSE/TSX 56 57 
TLM Talisman Energy Inc. Exploration and Production NYSE/TSX 1033 1125 
TOC Thomson Corp Information company AMEX/TSX 21 21 
Total       28843 19480 
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Table 2: The control purely US sample matched by industry and Tobin's q 
 
This table shows the information of control purely U.S. sample matched by industry and 
Tobin’s q. The values of Tobin’s q are presented in this table, and differences in q between the 
two matched firms are displayed as percentage in the last column. 
Cross-border listed 
Sample 
  Control Sample 
  
Symbol 
Tobin's 
q Industry Symbol
Tobin's 
q ∆ 
ABX 1.09 Gold Mining GG 1.16 0.07 
AEM 2.47 Gold Mining KGC 2.01 -0.18 
AGU 0.80 Specialty Chemicals ASH 0.79 -0.01 
BCE 0.40 Fixed Line Telecommunications CTL 0.30 -0.25 
BVF 0.97 Pharmaceuticals LLY 1.20 0.23 
CLS 0.14 Electrical Components and Equipment BEZ 0.17 0.22 
CNQ 0.41 Exploration and Production CHK 0.31 -0.24 
CP 0.35 Railroads CSX 0.34 -0.03 
ECA 0.60 Exploration and Production BTE 0.68 0.13 
ENB 0.40 Gas Distribution NWN 0.44 0.12 
ERF 0.64 Exploration and Production EGN 0.60 -0.06 
FDG 0.47 Coal ACI 0.50 0.06 
FFH 0.15 Property and Casualty Insurance EIG 0.13 -0.08 
IMO 2.08 Oil and Gas Extraction ARD 2.47 0.19 
IVN 2.26 Nonferrous Metals PCU 1.90 -0.16 
NCX 0.10 Commodity Chemicals HUN 0.08 -0.15 
NG 0.74 Metals Mining CLF 0.52 -0.29 
NT 0.57 Telecommunications Equipment TNS 0.57 -0.01 
NXY 0.35 Exploration and Production ALJ 0.33 -0.05 
POT 2.32 Specialty Chemicals CCC 2.32 0.00 
RY 0.05 Banks KEY 0.04 -0.20 
SLF 0.04 Life Insurance SFG 0.05 0.30 
SLW 1.44 Platinum and Precious Metals SWC 0.79 -0.45 
SU 0.70 Integrated Oil and Gas CVX 0.83 0.19 
TCK 0.11 Nonferrous Metals USU 0.12 0.11 
TD 0.05 Banks BBT 0.06 0.20 
THI 2.31 Restaurants and Bars MCD 1.99 -0.14 
TLM 0.50 Exploration and Production BBG 0.64 0.28 
TOC 0.95 Information company ASF 0.84 -0.11 
The mean and standard deviation of the variation (∆) are -1.1% and 18.6%, respectively. 
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Table 2 Panel B: Summary of 29 firms in the purely U.S. sample 
 
This table displays the company information for the control sample consists of 29 domestic 
listed US firms. The numbers of observations obtained from the U.S. market are also shown 
in this table. 
Symbol Company name Industry Exchange U.S.(obs.) 
ACI Arch Coal Inc. Coal NYSE  1387 
ALJ Alon USA Energy Inc.  Exploration and Production NYSE  472 
ARD Arena Resources Inc. Oil and Gas Extraction NYSE  524 
ASF Administaff Inc. Information company NYSE  500 
ASH Ashland Inc. Specialty Chemicals NYSE  484 
BBG Bill Barrett Corp. Exploration and Production NYSE  163 
BBT BB&T Inc. Banks NYSE  836 
BEZ Baldor Electric Co. 
Electrical Components and 
Equipment NYSE  40 
BTE Baytex Energy Trust Exploration and Production NYSE  80 
CCC Calgon Carbon Corporation Specialty Chemicals NYSE  90 
CHK 
Chesapeake Energy Corpora-
tion  Exploration and Production NYSE  1561 
CLF Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. Metals Mining NYSE  1353 
CSX CSX Corp. Railroads NYSE  1385 
CTL CenturyTel, Inc. Fixed Line Telecommunications NYSE  151 
CVX Chevron Corp. Integrated Oil and Gas NYSE  1723 
EGN Energen Corp. Exploration and Production NYSE  60 
EIG Employers Holdings, Inc.  Property and Casualty Insurance NYSE  5 
GG Goldcorp Inc. Gold Mining NYSE  1600 
HUN Huntsman Corp. Commodity Chemicals NYSE  311 
KEY KeyCorp Banks NYSE  630 
KGC Kinross Gold Corporation  Gold Mining NYSE  1185 
LLY Eli Lilly & Co. Pharmaceuticals NYSE  1259 
MCD McDonald's Corp. Restaurants and Bars NYSE  1673 
NWN Northwest Natural Gas Co.  Gas Distribution NYSE  10 
PCU Southern Copper Corp.  Nonferrous Metals NYSE  1732 
SFG StanCorp Financial Group Inc. Life Insurance NYSE  31 
SWC Stillwater Mining Company Platinum and Precious Metals NYSE  641 
TNS TNS Inc. Telecommunications Equipment NYSE  5 
USU USEC Inc. Nonferrous Metals NYSE  1235 
Total       21126 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for option pairs in three samples 
 
This table displays the summary statistics of maturity and option trading volume, for the two 
cross-border listed samples and one control sample.  
 
Notes to Table A3: Cross-listed Canadian is the sample which consists of Canadian market 
quotes of the 29 cross-listed firms. Cross-listed US sample is composed of stock and option 
prices of the 29 cross-listed firms, and all prices are obtained from the U.S. markets. Purely 
US is the sample made up of stocks and options issued by the 29 matched firms. 
Volume_C denotes the trading volume of call options. 
Volume_P denotes the trading volume of put options. 
  
Cross-listed Canadian Cross-listed US Pure US
Maturity Volume_C Volume_P Maturity Volume_C Volume_P Maturity Volume_C Volume_P
Mean 73.3354 51.4656 34.7291 75.093 290.041 178.943 64.4626 482.169 283.87
Maximum 178 6194 4507 178 30361 30154 178 234940 27981
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Median 59 20 15 59 70 39 49 121 60
S.D. 51.5362 139.363 93.4161 52.3949 854.853 625.492 50.0313 2178.34 834.431
Skewness 0.4256 14.5793 19.2524 0.376 12.9059 15.6802 0.7263 69.4011 10.2019
Kurtosis -1.1142 350.21 584.291 -1.1876 291.384 453.552 -0.6835 6847.73 180.249
N 28843 28843 28843 19480 19480 19480 21126 21126 21126
  
46 
 
Table 4: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian sample generated from violations of 
put-call parity 
Panel A: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian sample generated from violations of do-
mestic put-call parity 
 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian sample obtained from Ine-
quality (5.2) and (5.3). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage 
percentage values generated from domestic put-call parity are given in this table. All infor-
mation is listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi2 arbi2(%) arbi3 arbi3(%) 
ABX 3085 2 0.06% 1 0.03% 
AEM 1977 0 0 0 0 
AGU 1053 0 0 0 0 
BCE 104 0 0 4 3.85% 
BVF 538 0 0 6 1.12% 
CLS 26 0 0 1 3.85% 
CNQ 1897 5 0.26% 0 0 
CP 268 0 0 0 0 
ECA 1997 4 0.20% 1 0.05% 
ENB 15 0 0 0 0 
ERF 149 0 0 5 3.36% 
FDG 530 0 0 0 0 
FFH 7 0 0 0 0 
IMO 126 0 0 0 0 
IVN 143 0 0 0 0 
NCX 207 0 0 1 0.48% 
NG 85 0 0 0 0 
NT 1245 3 0.24% 1 0.08% 
NXY 714 3 0.42% 5 0.70% 
POT 6627 1 0.02% 1 0.02% 
RY 537 7 1.30% 5 0.93% 
SLF 31 0 0 0 0 
SLW 830 5 0.60% 0 0 
SU 3971 1 0.03% 1 0.03% 
TCK 1131 3 0.27% 13 1.15% 
TD 440 1 0.23% 0 0 
THI 56 0 0 0 0 
TLM 1033 0 0 4 0.39% 
TOC 21 0 0 0 0 
 Arithmetic average     0.13%   0.55% 
Total  28843 35    49   
Weighted average   0.12%      0.17% 
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Table 4 Panel B: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian sample generated from violations 
of cross-border put-call parity 
 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian sample obtained from Ine-
quality (5.4) and (5.5). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage 
percentage values generated from cross-border put-call parity are given in this table. All in-
formation is listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi4 arbi4(%) arbi5 arbi5(%) 
ABX 3085 0 0 0 0 
AEM 1977 0 0 0 0 
AGU 1053 0 0 0 0 
BCE 104 0 0 0 0 
BVF 538 0 0 6 1.12% 
CLS 26 0 0 0 0 
CNQ 1897 0 0 0 0 
CP 268 0 0 0 0 
ECA 1997 4 0.20% 1 0.05% 
ENB 15 0 0 0 0 
ERF 149 0 0 5 3.36% 
FDG 530 0 0 0 0 
FFH 7 0 0 0 0 
IMO 126 0 0 0 0 
IVN 143 0 0 0 0 
NCX 207 0 0 0 0 
NG 85 0 0 0 0 
NT 1245 3 0.24% 0 0 
NXY 714 15 2.10% 0 0 
POT 6627 0 0 0 0 
RY 537 1 0.19% 2 0.37% 
SLF 31 0 0 0 0 
SLW 830 5 0.60% 0 0 
SU 3971 0 0 1 0.03% 
TCK 1131 4 0.35% 4 0.35% 
TD 440 0 0 0 0 
THI 56 0 0 0 0 
TLM 1033 0 0 1 0.10% 
TOC 21 0 0 0 0 
 Arithmetic average     0.13%   0.19% 
Total  28843 32    20   
Weighted average   0.11%      0.07% 
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Table 5: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed US sample generated from violations of 
put-call parity 
Panel A: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed US sample generated from violations of do-
mestic put-call parity  
 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in cross-listed US sample obtained from Ine-
quality (5.2) and (5.3). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage 
percentage values generated from domestic put-call parity are given in this table. All in-
formation is listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi2 arbi2(%) arbi3 arbi3(%) 
ABX 1731 0 0 0 0 
AEM 1198 0 0 0 0 
AGU 775 0 0 0 0 
BCE 112 0 0 0 0 
BVF 431 0 0 0 0 
CLS 25 0 0 0 0 
CNQ 1538 0 0 0 0 
CP 230 0 0 0 0 
ECA 1985 0 0 0 0 
ENB 15 0 0 0 0 
ERF 117 0 0 0 0 
FDG 374 0 0 0 0 
FFH 7 0 0 0 0 
IMO 134 0 0 0 0 
IVN 129 0 0 0 0 
NCX 204 0 0 0 0 
NG 51 0 0 0 0 
NT 1245 2 0.16% 0 0 
NXY 682 0 0 2 0.29% 
POT 1582 0 0 1 0.06% 
RY 735 0 0 0 0 
SLF 36 0 0 0 0 
SLW 657 0 0 0 0 
SU 1872 0 0 0 0 
TCK 1782 0 0 1 0.05% 
TD 630 0 0 0 0 
THI 57 0 0 0 0 
TLM 1125 0 0 0 0 
TOC 21 0 0 0 0 
Arithmetic average     0   0 
Total  19480 2   4   
Weighted average     0.01%   0.02% 
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Table 5 Panel B: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed US sample generated from violations of 
cross-border put-call parity 
 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in cross-listed US sample obtained from Inequality 
(5.4) and (5.5). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage percentage 
values generated from cross-border put-call parity are given in this table. All information is 
listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi4 arbi4(%) arbi5 arbi5(%) 
ABX 1731 1 0.06% 12 0.69% 
AEM 1198 3 0.25% 15 1.25% 
AGU 775 0 0 2 0.26% 
BCE 112 0 0 0 0 
BVF 431 14 3.25% 1 0.23% 
CLS 25 0 0 0 0 
CNQ 1538 3 0.20% 3 0.20% 
CP 230 1 0.43% 3 1.30% 
ECA 1985 6 0.30% 16 0.81% 
ENB 15 0 0 0 0 
ERF 117 0 0 0 0 
FDG 374 0 0 3 0.80% 
FFH 7 0 0 0 0 
IMO 134 0 0 1 0.75% 
IVN 129 0 0 0 0 
NCX 204 3 1.47% 1 0.49% 
NG 51 0 0 0 0 
NT 1245 0 0 2 0.16% 
NXY 682 0 0 16 2.35% 
POT 1582 2 0.13% 29 1.83% 
RY 735 0 0 0 0 
SLF 36 0 0 0 0 
SLW 657 0 0 1 0.15% 
SU 1872 2 0.11% 21 1.12% 
TCK 1782 0 0 18 1.01% 
TD 630 0 0 0 0 
THI 57 0 0 0 0 
TLM 1125 0 0 9 0.80% 
TOC 21 0 0 0 0 
Arithmetic average     0.21%   0.50% 
Total  19480 35   153   
Weighted average     0.18%   0.78% 
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Table 6: Arbitrage existing in pure US sample generated from violations of domestic put-call 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in control US sample obtained from Inequality (5.2) 
and (5.3). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage percentage values 
generated from domestic put-call parity are given in this table. All information is listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi2 arbi2(%) arbi3 aibi3(%) 
ACI 1387 0 0 0 0 
ALJ 472 0 0 0 0 
ARD 524 0 0 1 0.19% 
ASF 500 0 0 0 0 
ASH 484 0 0 1 0.21% 
BBG 163 0 0 0 0 
BBT 836 0 0 0 0 
BEZ 40 0 0 0 0 
BTE 80 0 0 0 0 
CCC 90 0 0 0 0 
CHK 1561 0 0 0 0 
CLF 1353 0 0 0 0 
CSX 1385 0 0 0 0 
CTL 151 0 0 0 0 
CVX 1723 0 0 0 0 
EGN 60 0 0 0 0 
EIG 5 0 0 0 0 
GG 1600 0 0 0 0 
HUN 311 0 0 0 0 
KEY 630 0 0 0 0 
KGC 1185 2 0.17% 0 0 
LLY 1259 0 0 0 0 
MCD 1673 0 0 0 0 
NWN 10 0 0 0 0 
PCU 1732 0 0 0 0 
SFG 31 0 0 0 0 
SWC 641 0 0 0 0 
TNS 5 0 0 0 0 
USU 1235 0 0 0 0 
Arithmetic average     0.01%   0.01% 
Total 21126 2   2   
Weighted average     0.01%   0.01% 
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Table 7 Arbitrage opportunities sorted by date 
Panel A: Arbitrage opportunities reported by date in inter-listed Canadian sample 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in all three samples obtained from Inequality (5.2), 
(5.3), (5.4) and (5.5). All arbitrage opportunities are reported by date. In Panel A, * denotes the 
special day March 14th, 2007. Put-call parity was violated in most of the observations that day, 
whereas arbitrage opportunities occurred occasionally in other days.  
Date Obs arbi2 arbi2(%) arbi3 arbi3(%) arbi4 arbi4(%) arbi5 arbi5(%) 
1/3/2007 141 1 0.71% 0 0 1 0.71% 0 0 
1/5/2007 130 2 1.54% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1/8/2007 101 1 0.99% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1/12/2007 102 1 0.98% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1/16/2007 99 1 1.01% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1/31/2007 85 0 0 1 1.18% 0 0 0 0 
2/27/2007 142 0 0 1 0.70% 0 0 0 0 
3/14/2007* 88 26 29.55% 13 14.77% 16 18.18% 9 10.23% 
3/15/2007 73 0 0 6 8.22% 0 0 6 8.22% 
3/19/2007 94 0 0 5 5.32% 0 0 0 0 
5/3/2007 120 0 0 0 0 2 1.67% 0 0 
5/11/2007 114 0 0 0 0 4 3.51% 0 0 
5/14/2007 103 0 0 0 0 2 1.94% 0 0 
5/15/2007 95 0 0 1 1.05% 6 6.32% 0 0 
5/18/2007 117 1 0.85% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5/23/2007 90 1 1.11% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6/11/2007 78 0 0 1 1.28% 0 0 0 0 
7/3/2007 89 0 0 1 1.12% 0 0 0 0 
7/9/2007 81 0 0 1 1.23% 0 0 0 0 
7/23/2007 132 0 0 5 3.79% 0 0 1 0.76% 
7/24/2007 185 0 0 3 1.62% 0 0 0 0 
7/26/2007 156 0 0 1 0.64% 0 0 0 0 
7/30/2007 160 1 0.63% 0 0 1 0.63% 0 0 
7/31/2007 161 0 0 1 0.62% 0 0 0 0 
8/13/2007 117 0 0 1 0.85% 0 0 0 0 
10/15/2007 156 0 0 1 0.64% 0 0 0 0 
10/30/2007 204 0 0 1 0.49% 0 0 0 0 
11/6/2007 200 0 0 1 0.50% 0 0 0 0 
12/19/2007 131 0 0 1 0.76% 0 0 0 0 
12/20/2007 117 0 0 1 0.85% 0 0 0 0 
12/24/2007 130 0 0 1 0.77% 0 0 0 0 
12/28/2007 166 0 0 2 1.20% 0 0 0 0 
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Table 7 Panel B: Arbitrage opportunities reported by date in inter-listed U.S. sample 
Date Obs arbi2 arbi3 arbi4 arbi5 Date Obs arbi2 arbi3 arbi4 arbi5 
1/3/2007 129 0 0 0 2 5/4/2007 98 0 0 0 7 
1/5/2007 117 0 0 0 3 5/8/2007 82 0 0 1 4 
1/16/2007 78 0 0 0 1 5/11/2007 87 0 1 1 0 
1/17/2007 62 0 0 1 0 5/14/2007 73 0 0 1 4 
1/19/2007 68 0 0 0 1 5/15/2007 61 0 0 0 5 
1/22/2007 68 0 0 0 2 5/16/2007 83 0 1 1 1 
1/24/2007 95 0 1 0 1 5/17/2007 93 0 0 0 2 
1/26/2007 80 0 0 0 1 5/18/2007 82 0 0 0 3 
1/29/2007 65 0 0 0 1 5/22/2007 103 0 0 0 2 
2/1/2007 65 0 0 0 1 5/24/2007 115 0 0 0 3 
2/5/2007 62 0 0 0 1 5/25/2007 79 0 0 0 3 
2/6/2007 69 0 0 0 1 6/4/2007 63 0 0 0 1 
2/12/2007 64 0 0 0 2 6/7/2007 87 0 0 0 1 
2/20/2007 88 0 0 0 1 6/11/2007 55 0 0 0 3 
2/22/2007 68 0 0 0 1 6/12/2007 71 0 0 0 2 
2/23/2007 50 0 0 0 1 6/13/2007 67 0 0 0 2 
2/26/2007 56 0 0 0 1 6/14/2007 90 0 0 1 0 
2/27/2007 108 0 0 0 2 6/15/2007 79 0 0 0 1 
2/28/2007 75 0 0 0 1 6/19/2007 61 0 0 0 2 
3/1/2007 80 0 0 0 2 6/22/2007 54 0 0 0 2 
3/5/2007 70 0 0 0 3 6/25/2007 57 0 0 0 3 
3/6/2007 75 0 0 0 1 6/26/2007 80 0 0 0 2 
3/7/2007 79 0 0 0 1 6/29/2007 35 0 0 3 1 
3/13/2007 71 0 0 0 5 7/3/2007 64 0 0 2 6 
3/15/2007 61 0 0 0 1 7/5/2007 73 0 1 0 4 
3/16/2007 58 0 0 0 3 7/9/2007 58 0 0 0 1 
3/19/2007 76 0 0 0 6 7/12/2007 79 0 0 0 1 
3/22/2007 90 0 0 1 3 7/19/2007 92 0 0 1 3 
3/26/2007 76 0 0 0 1 7/26/2007 139 0 0 5 3 
3/28/2007 69 0 0 0 1 7/27/2007 83 0 0 0 3 
4/5/2007 66 0 0 0 1 7/31/2007 108 0 0 0 5 
4/18/2007 66 0 0 2 0 8/1/2007 102 1 0 5 0 
4/19/2007 88 0 0 2 0 8/9/2007 101 0 0 0 4 
4/23/2007 73 0 0 1 0 8/21/2007 62 1 0 0 0 
4/24/2007 81 0 0 1 0 9/5/2007 77 0 0 0 1 
4/26/2007 66 0 0 0 2 9/20/2007 114 0 0 0 1 
4/27/2007 77 0 0 1 0 11/8/2007 128 0 0 1 0 
4/30/2007 75 0 0 1 0 11/14/2007 95 0 0 1 0 
5/1/2007 68 0 0 0 4 11/23/2007 55 0 0 0 6 
5/3/2007 81 0 0 0 3 12/12/2007 68 0 0 2 0 
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Table 7 Panel C: Arbitrage opportunities reported by date in purely U.S. sample 
Date Obs arbi2 arbi3 arbi2(%) arbi3(%) 
1/23/2007 86 0 1 0 0 
3/5/2007 85 1 0 1.18% 0.01% 
4/25/2007 89 1 0 1.12% 0.01% 
11/2/2007 109 0 1 0 0 
Total   2 2     
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Intra-day price drops of some Canadian leading companies on March 13th, 2007 
This table displays the intraday price drops of eight Canadian leading companies. These 
prices downwards happened on March 13th, 2007 are obtained in both Canadian and the U.S. 
markets. Decimal values and percentages are given in this table.  
Symbol Company name Drop in Canadian Market Drop in the U.S. market 
ABX Barrick Gold Corp. C$1.1 (3%) $0.685 (2%) 
ECA EnCana Corp. C$0.73 (1.3%) $0.81 (1.7%) 
NT Nortel Networks Corp. C$1.51 (4%) $1.2 (4%) 
RY Royal Bank of Canada C$0.92 (1.6%) $0.9 (1.8%) 
SU Suncor Energy Inc. C$2 (2.5%) $1.8 (2.6%) 
TCK Teck Comino Limited C$0.505 (0.6%) $1.43 (1.9%) 
TD Toronto-Dominion Bank C$1.2 (1.7%) $0.68 (1.1%) 
TLM Talisman Energy Inc. C$0.35 (1.8%) $0.3 (1.9%) 
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Table 9: Price changes and co-movement on March 14th, 2007 in both the Canadian and the 
US 
This table presents the intraday price movement of 29 cross-border listed companies on 
March 14th, 2007. If the price movements in Canadian market are opposite with that of the 
U.S. market, we consider the co-movement of the two markets as negative (-).The symbol * 
denotes that the security prices of that firm violated put-call parity that day.  
Symbol Price change in CA (%) 
Price change in US 
(%) Co-movement 
ABX 0.8 -2.4 − 
AEM 1.49 0.93 + 
AGU 0.2 0.05 + 
BCE -0.1 -0.31 + 
BVF 0.61 0.49 + 
CLS 1.4 0.5 + 
CNQ* 1.03 -0.12 − 
CP 0.87 0.58 + 
ECA* 1.04 -0.84 − 
ENB 0.11 -0.25 − 
ERF -0.52 -0.56 + 
FDG -0.45 -0.88 + 
FFH 1.07 3.55 + 
IMO -1.18 -1.03 + 
IVN -1.34 -2.67 + 
NCX* -0.82 -1.03 + 
NG 1.3 0.12 + 
NT* 0.99 -3.13 − 
NXY* 1.22 0.95 + 
POT* 0.77 0.51 + 
RY* -0.12 0.31 − 
SLF -1.2 -1.32 + 
SLW* 2.44 2.21 + 
SU* -0.08 2.4 − 
TCK* 0.18 -1.54 − 
TD* -0.94 0.4 − 
THI 0.06 0.13 + 
TLM* 0.58 -1.7 − 
TOC* 0.77 -0.07 − 
The symbol * denotes that the security prices of that firm violated put-call parity on March 
14th, 2007.  
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Table 10: One sided-test: Paired trading volume for options for means 
Panel A: One sided-test: Paired trading volume for call options for means 
Table 10 Panel A presents the results of mean-variance tests on option trading volume of the 
two countries. Average trading volume per option in Canada is compared to its counterpart in 
the U.S. market, firm by firm. 
  C_volume in CA C_volume in US 
Mean 58.4549 206.741
Variance 995.234 35040.2
Observations 29 29
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 28
t_Stat -4.4404
P-value 6.4E-05
t Critical at 99% 2.4671   
H0: C_volume in CA ≥ C_volume in US 
Ha: C_volume in CA < C_volume in US 
As t_Stat < -t_Ctitical 
We reject H0 for a 99% confidence interval. 
Thus, we can get the conclusion that the trading volume of call in Canadian option mar-
kets are significantly less than the trading volume of call in the U.S. option markets. 
 
Table 10 Panel B: One-sided test: Paired trading volume for put options for means 
         P_volume in CA    P_volume in US 
Mean 45.52729357 118.4644512
Variance 1019.154195 11439.3188
Observations 29 29
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 28
t_Stat -3.805300564
P-value 0.000353242
t Critical at 99% 2.467140089   
H0: P_volume in CA ≥ P_volume in US 
Ha: P_volume in CA < P_volume in US 
As t_Stat < -t_Ctitical 
We reject H0 for a 99% confidence interval. 
Thus, we can get the conclusion that the trading volume of put in Canadian option mar-
kets are significantly less than the trading volume of put in the U.S. option markets. 
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Table 11: One-sided test: Comparison between option trading volume in dramatic market 
price drops and normal monthly average 
Table 11 shows the details of mean-variance tests on option trading volume in sudden and 
dramatic market price drops. Average daily trading volume during the sharp price drops in 
Canadian market is compared to its corresponding monthly average. 
  
Trading volume 
in dramatic 
price drops 
Monthly aver-
age trading vo-
lume 
Mean 4200.71 5586.63
Variance 1298423 608431
Observations 10 10
Pearson Correlation 0.88592
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 9
t Stat -7.6062
P-value 1.7E-05
t Critical at 99% 2.82144   
H0: Trading volume in dramatic price drops ≥ Monthly average trading volume. 
Ha: Trading volume in dramatic price drops < Monthly average trading volume. 
As t_Stat <-t_Ctitical 
We reject H0 for a 99% confidence interval. 
Thus, we can get the conclusion that the option trading volume in dramatic price drops 
are less than corresponding monthly average. 
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Table 12: Summary statistics for option pairs in three samples (Full sample) 
This table displays the summary statistics of maturity and option trading volume, for the two 
cross-border listed full samples and one control full sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian sample generated from violations of 
Cross-listed Canadian Cross-listed US Pure US
Maturity Volume_C Volume_P Maturity Volume_C Volume_P Maturity Volume_C Volume_P
Mean 66.561 52.4389 35.8087 65.6443 232.196 143.237 67.1801 435.918 229.794
Maximum 178 7410 4507 178 95156 30153 178 708542 27981
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Median 50 20 16 51 54 32 51 76 46
S.D. 50.2499 152.045 95.1725 49.0669 921.739 509.478 50.0733 4949.36 765.043
Skewness 0.6302 16.2518 18.3404 0.6723 42.0222 18.3349 0.6395 93.733 11.9713
Kurtosis -0.8607 446.379 531.226 -0.7364 3476.47 642.109 -0.8028 11860.4 228.944
N 30625 30625 30625 35854 35854 35854 37838 37838 37838
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put-call parity (Full sample) 
Panel A: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian sample generated from violations of 
domestic put-call parity (Full sample) 
 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian full sample obtained from 
Inequality (5.2) and (5.3). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage 
percentage values generated from domestic put-call parity are given in this table. All infor-
mation is listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi2 arbi2(%) arbi3 arbi3(%) 
ABX 3090 2 0.06% 1 0.03% 
AEM 1979 0 0 0 0 
AGU 1057 0 0 0 0 
BCE 113 0 0 5 4.42% 
BVF 539 0 0 6 1.11% 
CLS 26 0 0 1 3.85% 
CNQ 1967 5 0.25% 0 0 
CP 268 0 0 0 0 
ECA 2241 2 0.09% 4 0.18% 
ENB 15 0 0 0 0 
ERF 149 0 0 5 3.36% 
FDG 530 0 0 0 0 
FFH 7 0 0 0 0 
IMO 137 0 0 0 0 
IVN 144 0 0 0 0 
NCX 221 0 0 1 0.45% 
NG 85 0 0 0 0 
NT 1403 6 0.43% 1 0.07% 
NXY 766 3 0.39% 5 0.65% 
POT 6627 1 0.02% 2 0.03% 
RY 736 8 1.09% 9 1.22% 
SLF 36 0 0 0 0 
SLW 830 5 0.60% 0 0 
SU 3972 2 0.05% 1 0.03% 
TCK 1804 5 0.28% 18 1.00% 
TD 632 1 0.16% 0 0 
THI 57 0 0 0 0 
TLM 1172 1 0.09% 4 0.34% 
TOC 22 0 0 0 0 
 Arithmetic average     0.18%   0.58% 
Total  30625 41    63   
Weighted average   0.32%      0.31% 
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Table 13 Panel B : Arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian sample generated from viola-
tions of cross-border put-call parity (Full sample) 
 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in cross-listed Canadian full sample obtained from 
Inequality (5.4) and (5.5). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage 
percentage values generated from cross-border put-call parity are given in this table. All in-
formation is listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi4 arbi4(%) arbi5 arbi5(%) 
ABX 3090 0 0 0 0 
AEM 1979 0 0 0 0 
AGU 1057 0 0 0 0 
BCE 113 0 0 0 0 
BVF 539 0 0 6 1.11% 
CLS 26 0 0 0 0 
CNQ 1967 1 0.05% 0 0 
CP 268 0 0 0 0 
ECA 2241 2 0.09% 3 0.13% 
ENB 15 0 0 0 0 
ERF 149 0 0 5 3.36% 
FDG 530 0 0 0 0 
FFH 7 0 0 0 0 
IMO 137 0 0 0 0 
IVN 144 0 0 0 0 
NCX 221 0 0 0 0 
NG 85 0 0 0 0 
NT 1403 6 0.43% 0 0 
NXY 766 15 1.96% 0 0 
POT 6627 0 0 0 0 
RY 736 2 0.27% 3 0.41% 
SLF 36 0 0 0 0 
SLW 830 5 0.60% 0 0 
SU 3972 1 0.03% 1 0.03% 
TCK 1804 7 0.39% 7 0.39% 
TD 632 0 0 0 0 
THI 57 0 0 0 0 
TLM 1172 0 0 1 0.09% 
TOC 22 0 0 0 0 
 Arithmetic average     0.13%   0.19% 
Total  30625 39    26   
Weighted average   0.13%      0.08% 
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Table 14: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed US sample generated from violations of put-call 
parity (Full sample) 
Panel A: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed US sample generated from violations of domestic 
put-call parity (Full sample) 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in cross-listed US full sample obtained from Ine-
quality (5.2) and (5.3). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage 
percentage values generated from domestic put-call parity are given in this table. All infor-
mation is listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi2 arbi2(%) arbi3 arbi3(%) 
ABX 3226 0 0 0 0 
AEM 2531 0 0 0 0 
AGU 1334 0 0 0 0 
BCE 258 0 0 0 0 
BVF 972 1 0.10% 0 0 
CLS 78 0 0 0 0 
CNQ 1986 0 0 0 0 
CP 456 0 0 0 0 
ECA 2078 0 0 0 0 
ENB 36 0 0 0 0 
ERF 1263 0 0 0 0 
FDG 1686 0 0 0 0 
FFH 268 0 0 0 0 
IMO 185 0 0 0 0 
IVN 512 0 0 0 0 
NCX 379 0 0 0 0 
NG 783 0 0 0 0 
NT 1379 2 0.15% 0 0 
NXY 810 0 0 2 0.25% 
POT 7369 0 0 2 0.03% 
RY 272 0 0 0 0 
SLF 20 0 0 0 0 
SLW 1533 0 0 0 0 
SU 4145 0 0 0 0 
TCK 905 0 0 1 0.11% 
TD 291 0 0 0 0 
THI 136 0 0 2 1.47% 
TLM 936 0 0 0 0 
TOC 27 0 0 0 0 
 Arithmetic average     0.01%   0.06% 
Total  35854 3    7   
Weighted average   0.01%      0.02% 
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Table 14 Panel B: Arbitrage existing in cross-listed US sample generated from violations of 
cross-border put-call parity (Full sample) 
 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in cross-listed US full sample obtained from Ine-
quality (5.4) and (5.5). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage 
percentage values generated from cross-border put-call parity are given in this table. All in-
formation is listed by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi4 arbi4(%) arbi5 arbi5(%) 
ABX 3226 1 0.03% 18 0.56% 
AEM 2531 4 0.16% 19 0.75% 
AGU 1334 1 0.07% 4 0.30% 
BCE 258 0 0 0 0 
BVF 972 17 1.75% 1 0.10% 
CLS 78 0 0 0 0 
CNQ 1986 4 0.20% 5 0.25% 
CP 456 0 0 6 1.32% 
ECA 2078 7 0.34% 17 0.82% 
ENB 36 0 0 0 0 
ERF 1263 0 0 0 0 
FDG 1686 0 0 3 0.18% 
FFH 268 0 0 0 0 
IMO 185 0 0 1 0.54% 
IVN 512 0 0 0 0 
NCX 379 3 0.79% 1 0.26% 
NG 783 0 0 0 0 
NT 1379 0 0 3 0.22% 
NXY 810 0 0 20 2.47% 
POT 7369 1 0.01% 88 1.19% 
RY 272 0 0 0 0 
SLF 20 0 0 0 0 
SLW 1533 0 0 1 0.07% 
SU 4145 3 0.07% 39 0.94% 
TCK 905 0 0 24 2.65% 
TD 291 0 0 0 0 
THI 136 0 0 0 0 
TLM 936 0 0 10 1.07% 
TOC 27 0 0 0 0 
 Arithmetic average     0.12%   0.47% 
Total  35854 41    260   
Weighted average   0.11%      0.73% 
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Table 15: Arbitrage existing in pure US sample generated from violations of domestic 
put-call parity (Full sample) 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in control US full sample obtained from Inequality 
(5.2) and (5.3). Arithmetic average and observation weighted average of arbitrage percentage 
values generated from domestic put-call parity are given in this table. All information is listed 
by firm. 
Symbol obs arbi2 arbi2(%) arbi3 aibi3(%) 
ACI 2198 0 0 0 0 
ALJ 545 0 0 0 0 
ARD 628 0 0 1 0.16% 
ASF 550 0 0 0 0 
ASH 545 0 0 1 0.18% 
BBG 168 0 0 0 0 
BBT 1056 0 0 0 0 
BEZ 41 0 0 0 0 
BTE 82 0 0 0 0 
CCC 91 0 0 0 0 
CHK 2961 0 0 0 0 
CLF 2886 0 0 0 0 
CSX 1962 0 0 0 0 
CTL 152 0 0 0 0 
CVX 3967 0 0 0 0 
EGN 67 0 0 0 0 
EIG 5 0 0 0 0 
GG 3644 0 0 2 0.05% 
HUN 357 0 0 0 0 
KEY 780 0 0 0 0 
KGC 1504 4 0.27% 0 0 
LLY 1544 0 0 0 0 
MCD 3443 0 0 1 0.03% 
NWN 10 0 0 0 0 
PCU 6012 0 0 0 0 
SFG 31 0 0 0 0 
SWC 699 0 0 0 0 
TNS 5 0 0 0 0 
USU 1905 0 0 0 0 
Arithmetic average     0.01%   0.01% 
Total 37838 4   5   
Weighted average   0     0 
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Table 16: Arbitrage opportunities reported by date (Full sample) 
Panel A: Arbitrage opportunities reported by date in inter-listed Canadian sample 
(Full sample) 
Date Obs arbi2 arbi3 arbi4 arbi5 
1/3/2007 166 1 0 1 0 
1/5/2007 148 2 0 0 0 
1/8/2007 102 1 0 0 0 
1/12/2007 114 1 0 0 0 
1/16/2007 105 1 0 0 0 
1/31/2007 89 0 1 0 0 
2/14/2007 111 1 0 1 0 
2/16/2007 95 1 0 1 0 
2/27/2007 151 1 1 1 0 
3/14/2007* 100 29 21 19 15 
3/15/2007 82 0 6 0 6 
3/19/2007 101 0 5 0 0 
5/3/2007 125 0 0 3 0 
5/11/2007 124 0 0 4 0 
5/14/2007 108 0 0 2 0 
5/15/2007 96 0 1 6 0 
5/18/2007 120 1 0 0 0 
5/23/2007 101 1 0 0 0 
6/11/2007 83 0 1 0 0 
7/3/2007 93 0 1 0 0 
7/9/2007 81 0 1 0 0 
7/23/2007 136 0 5 0 5 
7/24/2007 198 0 4 0 0 
7/26/2007 181 0 1 0 0 
7/30/2007 174 1 1 1 0 
7/31/2007 168 0 1 0 0 
8/9/2007 143 0 1 0 0 
8/13/2007 124 0 1 0 0 
8/16/2007 267 0 1 0 0 
10/15/2007 159 0 1 0 0 
10/30/2007 208 0 1 0 0 
11/6/2007 206 0 1 0 0 
11/19/2007 186 0 1 0 0 
12/19/2007 142 0 1 0 0 
12/20/2007 130 0 1 0 0 
12/24/2007 132 0 1 0 0 
12/27/2007 190 0 1 0 0 
12/28/2007 169 0 2 0 0 
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Table 16 Panel B: Arbitrage opportunities reported by date in inter-listed US sample  
(Full sample) 
 
Date Obs arbi2 arbi3 arbi4 arbi5 Date Obs arbi2 arbi3 arbi4 arbi5
1/3/2007 166 0 0 0 2 5/4/2007 120 0 0 0 7
1/5/2007 148 0 0 0 4 5/8/2007 117 0 0 1 5
1/16/2007 105 0 0 0 1 5/11/2007 124 0 2 1 0
1/17/2007 80 0 0 1 0 5/14/2007 108 0 0 1 4
1/19/2007 87 0 0 0 1 5/15/2007 96 0 0 0 6
1/22/2007 96 0 0 0 8 5/16/2007 122 0 1 1 1
1/23/2007 142 0 0 0 2 5/17/2007 127 0 0 0 3
1/24/2007 115 1 1 0 1 5/18/2007 120 0 0 0 15
1/26/2007 107 0 0 0 1 5/22/2007 131 0 0 0 3
1/29/2007 99 0 0 0 3 5/24/2007 146 0 0 0 5
1/30/2007 94 0 0 0 2 5/25/2007 109 0 0 0 5
1/31/2007 89 0 0 0 1 5/31/2007 118 0 1 0 1
2/1/2007 98 0 0 0 5 6/4/2007 98 0 0 0 2
2/5/2007 87 0 0 0 1 6/7/2007 129 0 0 0 1
2/6/2007 93 0 0 0 3 6/11/2007 83 0 0 0 4
2/7/2007 98 0 0 0 1 6/12/2007 99 0 0 0 2
2/9/2007 102 0 0 0 1 6/13/2007 95 0 0 0 2
2/12/2007 78 0 0 0 2 6/14/2007 120 0 0 1 0
2/13/2007 96 0 0 0 2 6/15/2007 106 0 0 0 1
2/20/2007 138 0 0 0 1 6/19/2007 101 0 0 0 4
2/21/2007 113 0 0 0 1 6/21/2007 84 0 0 1 0
2/22/2007 106 0 0 0 5 6/22/2007 80 0 0 0 4
2/23/2007 65 0 0 0 1 6/25/2007 82 0 0 0 3
2/26/2007 78 0 0 0 1 6/26/2007 95 0 0 0 3
2/27/2007 151 0 0 0 2 6/27/2007 105 0 1 0 1
2/28/2007 101 0 0 0 1 6/28/2007 61 0 0 0 1
3/1/2007 104 0 0 0 2 6/29/2007 44 0 0 4 1
3/2/2007 123 0 0 0 2 7/3/2007 93 0 0 0 9
3/5/2007 92 0 0 0 3 7/5/2007 107 0 1 0 4
3/6/2007 105 0 0 0 1 7/9/2007 81 0 0 0 1
3/7/2007 113 0 0 0 1 7/12/2007 102 0 0 0 1
3/13/2007 98 0 0 0 7 7/19/2007 127 0 0 0 6
3/15/2007 82 0 0 0 1 7/20/2007 127 0 0 0 1
3/16/2007 76 0 0 0 3 7/26/2007 181 0 0 6 6
3/19/2007 101 0 0 1 8 7/27/2007 112 0 0 0 4
3/22/2007 110 0 0 1 4 7/31/2007 168 0 0 0 10
3/26/2007 93 0 0 0 1 8/1/2007 166 1 0 6 0
3/28/2007 91 0 0 0 4 8/9/2007 143 0 0 0 7
4/2/2007 93 0 0 1 0 8/21/2007 91 1 0 0 0
4/5/2007 106 0 0 0 1 9/5/2007 117 0 0 0 1
4/9/2007 110 0 0 0 1 9/20/2007 192 0 0 0 1
4/11/2007 101 0 0 0 2 10/30/2007 208 0 0 0 1
4/18/2007 114 0 0 2 0 11/8/2007 243 0 0 1 0
4/19/2007 121 0 0 2 0 11/13/2007 219 0 0 0 1
4/23/2007 115 0 0 2 0 11/14/2007 167 0 0 1 0
4/24/2007 112 0 0 1 0 11/23/2007 80 0 0 0 6
4/26/2007 111 0 0 0 6 12/12/2007 133 0 0 3 0
4/27/2007 108 0 0 1 0 12/21/2007 150 0 0 0 1
4/30/2007 111 0 0 1 1 12/24/2007 132 0 0 1 0
5/1/2007 101 0 0 0 8 12/27/2007 190 0 0 0 2
5/3/2007 125 0 0 0 5
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Table 16 Panel C: Arbitrage opportunities reported by date in purely US sample 
(Full sample) 
Date Obs arbi2 arbi3 arbi2(%) arbi3(%) 
1/23/2007 135 0 1 0 0.74% 
2/14/2007 112 0 1 0 0.89% 
3/5/2007 134 1 0 0.75% 0 
3/8/2007 103 1 0 0.97% 0 
3/14/2007 99 1 0 1.01% 0 
4/25/2007 148 1 0 0.68% 0 
5/15/2007 145 0 1 0 0.69% 
5/16/2007 145 0 1 0 0.69% 
11/2/2007 238 0 1 0 0.42% 
Total   4 5     
 
This table displays the arbitrage existing in all three full samples obtained from Inequality 
(5.2), (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5). All arbitrage opportunities are reported by date. In Panel A, * 
denotes the special day March 14th, 2007. Put-call parity was violated in most of the observa-
tions that day, whereas arbitrage opportunities occurred occasionally in other days.  
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Figure 1: S&P 500 daily closing prices in 2007 
This figure displays the S&P 500 price movements in 2007. Closing prices are adopted in this 
figure.  
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Figure 2: Intraday price changes of S&P 500 and S&P/TSX in 2007 
The first figure displays the S&P 500 intraday price changes in 2007. Closing prices are 
adopted in this figure. The lines above x-axis represent price increase, whereas lines below 
x-axis stand for price drops.  
 
 
 
The second figure displays the S&P/TSX intraday price changes in 2007. Closing prices are 
adopted in this figure. The lines above x-axis represent price increase, whereas lines below 
x-axis stand for price drops.  
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Figure 3: Price movements of the S&P/TSX composite index and the Dow Jones industrial 
average 
Figure 3 displays the daily quotes of the S&P /TSX and the Dow Jones industrial average 
in 2007. The figure shows that the patterns of the two indices are similar. The results of coin-
tegration tests follow the figure. 
 
 
ADF test for stationary of Dow Jones closing price 
     Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Single Mean 0 -7.6037 0.2353 -2.08 0.2519 2.25 0.4969 
1 -6.1722 0.3306 -1.89 0.3368 1.9 0.5876 
2 -6.2216 0.3268 -1.92 0.3211 1.99 0.5641 
  3 -7.8636 0.2209 -2.1 0.2444 2.31 0.4832 
Philips-Perron test for stationarity of 1-differenced Dow Jones closing price 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau     Pr < Tau 
Single mean 0 -278.5 0.0001*** -17.81 <.0001*** 
1 -278.09 0.0001*** -17.82 <.0001*** 
  2 -277.11 0.0001*** -17.83 <.0001*** 
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ADF test for stationary of S&P/TSX closing price 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Single Mean 0 -9.4947 0.1487 -2.43 0.1345 3.13 0.2728 
1 -9.3044 0.1557 -2.51 0.115 3.41 0.2032 
2 -11.099 0.1002 -2.74 0.0693* 4.02 0.087* 
  3 -13.167 0.0598* -2.84 0.0544* 4.25 0.0733* 
Philips-Perron test for stationarity of 1-differenced S&P/TSX closing price 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau    Pr < Tau 
Single mean 0 -264.26 0.0001*** -16.88 <.0001*** 
1 -264.38 0.0001*** -16.88 <.0001*** 
  2 -270.49 0.0001*** -16.85 <.0001*** 
ADF test for stationary of residual of Dow Jones and S&P/TSX 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Single mean 0 -16.351 0.0266 -2.92 0.0447 4.3 0.0702* 
1 -16.962 0.0227 -3 0.0368 4.56 0.054* 
2 -14.948 0.038 -2.78 0.0626 3.94 0.092* 
  3 -16.67 0.0244 -2.86 0.0524 4.14 0.0798* 
* Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% significance level. 
***Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 1% significance level. 
Rho stands for the coefficient of a lagged dependent variable. 
Tau denotes the calculated t value. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of arbitrage reported on March 14th, 2007 
This figure presents the distribution of opportunities for arbitrage on March 14th. There were 
total 12 firms reported arbitrage that day, 7 of them are well known leading companies in 
their industry. The names of the 7 companies and their arbitrage contribution that day are 
shown in this figure. 
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Figure 5: Trading volume of options in the US and Canadian markets 
 
The first figure presents the trading volume of call options in the two countries. Average 
trading volume per option in the Canadian market is compared to its counterpart in the U.S. 
market, firm by firm. 
  
C_volume_CA denotes the trading volume of call options issued by the cross-listed Canadian 
firms in Canadian market. 
C_volume_US denotes the trading volume of call options issued by the cross-listed Canadian 
firms in the U.S. market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
A
B
X
A
EM
A
G
U
B
C
E
B
V
F
C
LS
C
N
Q C
P
EC
A
EN
B
ER
F
FD
G
FF
H
IM
O
IV
N
N
C
X
N
G N
T
N
X
Y
PO
T
R
Y
SL
F
SL
W SU
TC
K TD TH
I
TL
M
TO
C
C_volume_CA
C_volume_US
  
72 
 
The second figure presents the trading volume of put options in the two countries. Average 
trading volume per option in Canadian market is compared to its counterpart in the U.S. 
market, firm by firm. 
 
P_volume_CA denotes the trading volume of put options issued by the cross-listed Canadian 
firms in Canadian market. 
P_volume_US denotes the trading volume of put options issued by the cross-listed Canadian 
firms in the U.S. market. 
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Figure 6: Dramatic price drops in the Canadian market in 2007 
 
This figure shows the closing price movements of the S&P/TSX composite index in 2007. 
The biggest 10 price drops as well as their potential reasons are labelled in this figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11,500.00
12,000.00
12,500.00
13,000.00
13,500.00
14,000.00
14,500.00
15,000.00
S&P/ TSX composite index Closing prices-
2007
Closing value
Feb 27:Chinese stock 
dropped 8.8%
March 13:Subprime 
mortgage trouble  in the 
U.S.
Apr 30: Energy 
Sell off.
June 6: Fears of interest 
rate rising.
June 26:  Concerns with 
subprime mortgage
problem.
July 20: Fears of 
tightening  credit 
conditions.
Aug 17: Interest rate 
declined in the U.S.
Oct 19: Credit 
squeeze worries.
Nov 9-12: Credit 
crisis in the U.S.
Dec 18: Concerns with 
US inflation problem.
Source: The Informer 2008(2).
  
74 
 
Figure 7: The time line of the 10 biggest stock price drops in the Canadian market in 2007 
 
Figure 7 displays the time intervals between the 10 biggest price drops in the Canadian mar-
ket 2007. It is obvious that the time interval between the first and second market slump is the 
shortest among the total 9 time intervals. 
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Figure 8: The option trading volume in the 10 biggest market price drops. 
 
Figure 8 shows the option trading volume in market crash and its corresponding monthly av-
erage value. Average daily trading volume during the sharp price drops in the Canadian mar-
ket is less than its corresponding monthly average, based on this Figure. 
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